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Abstract 
The work examined whether activating a domain of a close other’s contingency of acceptance 
leads to more anxiety in anticipation of an evaluative performance in that domain (Study 1), and 
greater effort toward improving oneself in that domain (Study 2). In a between-group 
experimental design, contingencies of acceptance were manipulated by a guided visualization of 
a close other whose acceptance was perceived either as non-contingent (intrinsic), contingent on 
a task-irrelevant domain (physical appearance), or contingent on a task-relevant domain 
(competence). The effects of the acceptance contingency condition on anxiety and effort were 
not statistically significant. However, in Study 1, six risk factors for being vulnerable to the 
influence of contingencies of acceptance were identified. There was an indication of an 
interaction between the presence of risk factors and acceptance contingency condition. 
Specifically, individuals classified as at high risk of susceptibility to acceptance contingencies 
(but not those at low risk) reported considerably more anxiety in competence acceptance 
contingency condition compared to intrinsic acceptance contingency condition (d = 0.77). These 
results suggest that perceived potential for failure in the domain of competence may constitute a 
threat to one’s level of social acceptance, and that shifting an activated acceptance contingency 
to a domain irrelevant to the pursuit of competence may reduce anxiety about a performance 
evaluative of one’s competence for people vulnerable to the influence of acceptance 
contingencies. However, caution has to be exercised in interpreting the results due to violation of 
assumptions of conducted statistical significance tests. 
  
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 I would like to express my thanks, first of all, to my advisor, Matthew Bernacki, whose 
always prompt and thorough feedback contributed greatly to the completion of this thesis. I 
would also like to acknowledge members of my committee—CarolAnne Kardash, Gwen 
Marchand, and Rachael Robnett—for their thoughtful comments on methods and 
conceptualization of the present work. 
Finally, my gratitude goes to the anonymous members of the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
workforce for their willingness to devote time to attentively respond to my surveys. 
  
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iv 
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................v 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ...........................................................................................................4 
Need and Motivation for Relational Value ..................................................................................4 
Domain-Specific Contingencies of Self-Esteem ..........................................................................7 
Relational Self and Situationally Activated Acceptance Contingencies ....................................11 
Relational Value and Pursuit of Competence ............................................................................18 
Chapter 3: Present Studies .............................................................................................................22 
Overview of Present Studies ......................................................................................................22 
Overview of Methods .................................................................................................................23 
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................................23 
Chapter 4: Methods ........................................................................................................................28 
Study 1: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety .......................................................29 
Study 2: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort ...........................................................43 
Chapter 5: Results ..........................................................................................................................48 
Study 1: Preliminary Analyses ...................................................................................................49 
Study 1: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety (Confirmatory Analysis) ...............60 
Study 1: Exploratory Analyses ...................................................................................................62 
vi 
 
Study 2: Preliminary Analyses ...................................................................................................73 
Study 2: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort (Confirmatory Analyses) ..................82 
Study 2: Exploratory Analyses ...................................................................................................83 
Chapter 6: Discussion ....................................................................................................................84 
Overview ....................................................................................................................................84 
Limitations .................................................................................................................................86 
Lack of Observed Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort ...........................................91 
Effects of Activated Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety .....................................................92 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................................98 
References ......................................................................................................................................99 
Curriculum Vitae .........................................................................................................................110 
  
vii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the extent to which the identified close others accept one based 
on intrinsic qualities, appearance, and competence in Study 1 ......................................................50 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for desired closeness to the identified close others and for 
frequency of thinking about them in Study 1.................................................................................52 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for how the identified close others are perceived to evaluate 
participants’ competence and appearance in Study 1 ....................................................................53 
Table 4. Identified close others’ relationship to the participants in Study 1 ..................................54 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for variables used as covariates in the confirmatory analysis and 
additional variables that were used as moderators in exploratory analyses examining effects on 
anxiety ............................................................................................................................................56 
Table 6. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of anxiety for acceptance 
contingency condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor .........................................57 
Table 7. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of anxiety for acceptance 
contingency condition by susceptibility to acceptance contingencies ...........................................57 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of average anxiety displayed by dichotomized desired closeness to 
the close other with competence-contingent acceptance, and by experimental group ..................62 
Table 9. Correlations among the dichotomized variables used to investigate differential 
effectiveness of the experimental conditions .................................................................................63 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for the extent to which the identified close others accept one 
based on intrinsic qualities, appearance, and competence in Study 2 ...........................................74 
viii 
 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics for desired closeness to the identified close others and for 
frequency of thinking about them in Study 2.................................................................................75 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics for how the identified close others are perceived to evaluate 
participants’ competence and appearance in Study 2 ....................................................................75 
Table 13. Identified close others’ relationship to the participants in Study 2 ................................76 
Table 14. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of reading time on article 1 for 
acceptance contingency condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor .......................79 
Table 15. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of reading time on article 2 for 
acceptance contingency condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor .......................79 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the confirmatory analysis in Study 2 ....81 
 
 
 
  
ix 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Schema of the experimental design for Study 1 and Study 2 .........................................28 
Figure 2. Histogram for distribution of anxiety by acceptance contingency condition and by 
closeness to Competence Acceptor  ...............................................................................................59 
Figure 3. Histogram for distribution of anxiety by acceptance contingency condition and by 
susceptibility to acceptance contingencies.....................................................................................59 
Figure 4. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and desired closeness to 
Competence Acceptor ....................................................................................................................61 
Figure 5. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and frequency of 
thinking about Competence Acceptor ............................................................................................64 
Figure 6. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and need to belong ......66 
Figure 7. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and threat to relational 
value from Competence Acceptor .................................................................................................67 
Figure 8. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and contingency of self-
worth on academics........................................................................................................................69 
Figure 9. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and gender  ..................70 
Figure 10. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and susceptibility to 
acceptance contingencies ...............................................................................................................72 
Figure 11. Histograms for distribution of reading time 1 by acceptance contingency condition 
and by closeness to Competence Acceptor ....................................................................................80 
Figure 12. Histogram for distribution of reading time 2 by acceptance contingency condition and 
by closeness to Competence Acceptor  ..........................................................................................81 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
People have a need to feel valuable to those they care about (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
To reduce or prevent suffering that ensues when this fundamental need is unmet, people tend to 
engage in behaviors that restore or increase their relational value (“the degree to which other 
people regard their relationships with the individual to be valuable, important, or close”; Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000, p. 9). It may take different things to be valued and accepted by different 
people in one’s life. Let’s consider a fictitious person, Joanna. Joanna holds different beliefs 
about what it takes to be valued and accepted by different people in her life. For example, Joanna 
believes that her coworker mainly cares about her job performance. If Joanna performed poorly 
at her job, the coworker would value her less. In contrast, Joanna believes that her grandmother 
mainly cares about how kind she is to those around her. If Joanna was mean to her friends, her 
value as a person in the grandmother’s eyes would decline. When one is reminded of one’s close 
others, the contingencies of one’s relational value shift toward the domains on which one 
believes that the close others’ acceptance depends (Horberg & Chen, 2010). Accordingly, if 
Joanna was reminded of her coworker, her relational value in that moment would become more 
contingent on the coworker’s perceived contingencies of acceptance (in this case, work 
performance). 
By changing what one’s relational value is contingent on, reminders of one’s close others 
may change how one’s need for relational value manifests. These changes may include changes 
in what constitutes a threat to one’s relational value as well as changes in potential avenues 
through which one may increase one’s relational value. For example, poor work performance 
might be much more threatening to Joanna after having been reminded of her coworker rather 
than her grandmother because poor work performance may decrease Joanna’s relational value 
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with respect to the coworker to a much greater extent. If the coworker rather than the 
grandmother is on Joanna’s mind, Joanna may also be more inclined to try to improve her job 
performance because it holds a greater incentive for her in the form of relational value. 
This research examined how situational changes in acceptance contingencies may 
influence manifestation of the need for relational value in the context of pursuit of intellectual 
competence. Study 1 focused on emotional consequences of the shifts in what constitutes a threat 
to relational value that may result from shifts in acceptance contingencies. Specifically, it 
examined whether people experience less anxiety in anticipation of a test evaluative of their 
intellectual competence after having been reminded of close others whose acceptance does not 
depend on intellectual competence (compared to after having been reminded of those whose 
acceptance does). Because shifts of acceptance contingencies away from intellectual competence 
may reduce potential of poor performance on the test to reduce one’s relational value (and thus 
decrease social threat posed by the test), it was predicted that priming close others whose 
acceptance does not depend on competence would reduce self-reported anxiety. Study 2 focused 
on motivational changes that may accompany shifts in acceptance contingencies. Specifically, it 
examined whether people exert greater effort toward improving their intellectual competence (as 
operationalized by reading times on articles about intelligence training and how intensive 
package for training intelligence participants chose) after having been reminded of a close other 
whose acceptance is contingent on competence (or not). Because of potential for greater 
incentive in terms of relational value, it was hypothesized that activation of competence 
acceptance contingency would enhance effort toward improvement of intellectual competence. 
Being reminded of close others may be a commonplace occurrence in people’s mental 
lives that may potentially exert large cumulative effects. Because of that, any improvement in 
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understanding of how such occurrences may affect satisfaction and pursuit of arguably the most 
fundamental human psychological need—the need for relational value—is of considerable 
importance. This is especially so as satisfaction of the need for relational value is strongly 
associated with well-being (e.g., León & Núñez, 2012), and one’s level of success in the domain 
of activated acceptance contingency influences satisfaction of this need by influencing perceived 
relational value (Horberg & Chen, 2010). In addition to better understanding mechanisms 
through which one’s social environment may affect one’s well-being, the study of acceptance 
contingencies also bears implications for the study of human pursuits in all domains which may 
potentially become domains of acceptance contingency, or which may be affected if other 
domains become domains of acceptance contingency—be it because of changes in the 
individuals’ emotions or motivation. Greater understanding of mechanisms of acceptance 
contingencies may also be leveraged in future intervention work that targets bases of relational 
value or teaches individuals to change them on their own, so as to improve their psychological 
well-being. By further elucidating effects of contingencies of acceptance via their situational 
manipulation, the present work aimed to contribute toward building knowledge necessary for 
these endeavors. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The research tested responsiveness of people’s anxiety (Study 1) and exertion of effort 
(Study 2)—two processes relevant to pursuit of intellectual competence—to domains of 
activated relationship-specific acceptance contingencies. The rationale for the work was built on 
the following assumptions: (1) individuals have a need for relational value and motivation to 
enhance it; (2) relational value and its bases are responsive to changes in activation of cognitive 
representations of specific individuals; and (3) the bases of relational value can be affected by 
the activations of close others at sufficiently fine-grained level (at least at the level of domain-
specificity). The purpose of this literature review is to briefly overview support for these 
assumptions and discuss how together they may provide insights into how people’s perceptions 
of others and themselves in relation to others influence anxiety and effort during pursuit of 
intellectual competence (particularly as it pertains to learning in academic context). 
Need and Motivation for Relational Value 
The first assumption for the present work concerns the human need and motivation for 
relational value and is primarily based on theorizing and findings in the tradition of sociometer 
theory. 
Sociometer theory. According to sociometer theory, the need and motivation for 
relational value is intimately tied with the concept of self-esteem (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & 
Downs, 1995). Specifically, sociometer theory posits that self-esteem is an affective index of 
relational value, and that this affective index assists with monitoring of one’s past, present, and 
future relational evaluation (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary et al., 1995). Because of its 
affective nature, self-esteem may motivate restoration, maintenance, and augmentation of 
relational value. State self-esteem is assumed to reflect current perception of one’s worth to 
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others and trait self-esteem one’s perception of worth to others as reflected over a long period of 
time (Leary et al., 1995). Sociometer theorists maintain that self-esteem as an index of relational 
value developed because it was favored by evolutionary pressures: it alerted people to changes in 
their value to others and motivated them to restore relational value if it were to decline, which 
facilitated mating, securing resources from others, and avoidance of interpersonal conflict (Leary 
et al., 1995). 
It should be noted that relational value reflected by people’s self-esteem depends on 
people’s perceptions of their relational value (rather than actual relational value) and that 
relational value is theorized to be affected not only by perceptions of its current level but also 
perceptions of potential for its future changes (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). The reliance of 
relational value on perceptions allows for considerable malleability of relational value even in 
the absence of any new information from other individuals. 
The proposition of sociometer theory that self-esteem is interpersonally determined is 
supported by substantial evidence. Indirectly, sociometer theory is supported by prior research on 
what on the surface appears as pursuit of self-esteem but in fact could be interpreted as pursuit of 
relational value (for a review, see Leary, 2005). This research has documented a multitude of 
ways through which people self-enhance (Leary, 2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008), such as 
through dismissal of ability diagnosticity of a task in response to negative feedback and 
augmentation of ability diagnosticity of a task in response to positive feedback (Leitner, Jones, & 
Hehman, 2013), making excuses for one’s failure or even withdrawing effort to render potential 
failure undiagnostic of one’s ability (McCrea & Hirt, 2001), and befriending those who are 
worse than oneself in domains reported to be important to the self (Tesser, Campbell, & Smith, 
1984). These processes are consistent with sociometer theory because they all steer people 
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toward acting in ways that they internally can interpret as leading to being more valuable per 
others’ standards (Leary, 2005). There are also many examples of more direct support for 
interpersonal determinants of self-esteem, including responsiveness of state self-esteem to 
instances of social acceptance and rejection (Leary et al., 1995), overlap in importance of 
dimensions on which people’s self-esteem and perceived approval by others depend 
(MacDonald, Saltzman, & Leary, 2003), enhanced decreases in self-esteem following failure 
after increased salience of a close other who cares about what the failure might implicate 
(Horberg & Chen, 2010), or increases in self-esteem following classical conditioning procedure 
that taught individuals to associate themselves with accepting faces (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 
2004). 
While some people claim, counter to the sociometer theory, that their self-esteem is not 
affected by how others evaluate them, it is likely that these claims are a result of self-
presentation concerns or a lack of self-awareness. Leary et al. (2003) experimentally manipulated 
social approval and disapproval and found no interaction between self-reports of the dependence 
of self-esteem on social approval and participants’ self-esteem; in fact, those who claimed that 
their self-esteem is independent of others’ approval were affected by others’ disapproval to 
similar degree as those who claimed their self-esteem depends on others’ approval. Moreover, it 
is telling that self-reported contingency of self-esteem on others’ approval is inversely related to 
a measure of social desirability while the opposite pattern holds for contingencies such as virtue 
and God’s love (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003). 
Because people experience considerable deficits in well-being when the level of their 
relational value is deficient, it can be said that people have a need for relational value 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). But people may also pursue relational value even when their 
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relational value is not deficient, that is, when they are motivated to maintain or establish it rather 
than restore it in response to deficiency (Leary & Allen, 2011). Since only deficiency in 
relational value is linked to deficits in well-being, it can be assumed that there are differences 
between the influence of factors that guide people to act to restore or maintain their relational 
value and those that guide them to augment it. Evidence about how people are influenced by 
their perceptions of in what they need to succeed in order to be relationally valued can be 
inferred from research on contingencies of self-esteem. When examined as relatively stable 
individual differences (trait contingencies of self-esteem), contingencies of self-esteem can be 
seen as reflection of differences in people’s relatively stable conceptions of what it takes to be 
valued in their environment. 
Domain-Specific Contingencies of Self-Esteem 
Self-worth contingency model. According to the self-worth contingency model (Crocker 
& Wolfe, 2001), people’s self-esteem is contingent on different domains and fluctuates more in 
response to indices of success or failure in the domains of contingency. For example, state self-
esteem of graduate school applicants was shown to fluctuate in response to acceptances and 
rejections from graduate programs, and this fluctuation to both acceptances and rejections was 
shown to be moderated only by self-reported contingency of self-esteem on academic 
competence rather than also other contingencies such as contingency of self-esteem on physical 
appearance or virtue (Crocker, Sommers, & Luhtanen, 2002). In the domain of academics, this 
moderation by self-esteem contingency on academics (but not a general level of self-reported 
self-esteem contingency) has also been shown on measures of students’ state self-esteem, affect 
(which tends to accompany changes in self-esteem), and identification/belonging with major (the 
decrease in which may serve as a self-esteem protective measure; Leitner, Jones, & Hehman, 
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2013; Major & Schmader, 1998) in response to obtaining better or worse grades than the students 
expected (Crocker, Karpinski, Quinn, & Chase, 2003). At the level of trait self-esteem, the model 
would predict that those with a history of success in the domains of self-esteem contingency 
experience greater self-esteem than those with a history of failure in the domains of contingency. 
Intrapersonal vs. interpersonal perspectives. Researchers examining contingencies of 
self-worth have traditionally employed an intrapersonal perspective on self-esteem. Intrapersonal 
perspectives on self-esteem assume that self-esteem is determined by individual’s own self-
evaluations according to one’s own standards. Intrapersonal perspectives on self-esteem can be 
traced as far back as James’s (1890) speculation that self-esteem can be understood as a ratio of 
one’s own current level of competence to one’s desired level of competence in the domains of 
personal importance, with the individual being able to raise self-esteem either by achieving a 
higher level of competence or lowering one’s aims for desired competence.  In contrast, 
interpersonal perspectives on self-esteem—such as sociometer theory—have their origin in 
Cooley’s (1902) work on looking-glass self that described the process through which self-feeling 
emerges out of appraisal of one’s self-image and imagined others’ reaction to that image (also 
termed a reflected appraisal). The intrapersonal conceptualization of self-esteem in self-worth 
contingency model can be evidenced in the operationalization of self-esteem contingencies in 
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Crocker et al., 2003), which includes “acceptance from 
generalized others” as one of the contingency domains rather than an underlying determinant of 
all acceptance contingencies; as well as theorizing that classified self-esteem contingency on 
academics as a non-interpersonal contingency (Park, Crocker, & Mickelson, 2004). 
This is not to say that intrapersonal perspectives on self-esteem embraced by researchers 
examining self-esteem contingencies in educational settings are entirely bereft of assumptions 
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about social influences on self-esteem. The formation of self-esteem contingencies (in terms of 
which domains self-esteem is contingent on, Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; or in terms of whether self-
esteem is vs. is not contingent, Moller, Friedman, & Deci, 2006) tends to be attributed by these 
researchers to gradual socialization influences as individuals learn (primarily in childhood) the 
conditions of obtaining close others’ esteem, love, and acceptance (as discussed, e.g., in Crocker 
& Park, 2004). 
That individuals’ self-esteem will be differentially responsive to indications of 
performance in different domains can be predicted using either perspective but the use of 
intrapersonal perspective diminishes the extent to which the domains of self-esteem contingency 
and standards used for self-evaluation in these domains are predicted to be influenced or 
determined by other people. This has implications for how the relationship between self-esteem 
contingencies and other variables is researched. In particular, insufficient consideration of 
interpersonal determinants of self-esteem contingencies has led to treatment of self-esteem 
contingencies as relatively stable individual differences separated from relational factors that 
may mediate or moderate their effects (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007). 
Domain-specific contingencies of self-esteem as domain-specific contingencies of 
acceptance. The proposition of sociometer theory that self-esteem reflects relational value can 
be extended to the proposition that self-esteem is primarily responsive to satisfaction of 
standards and contingencies of interpersonal acceptance. If, for example, one believes that one’s 
relational value in the close others’ eyes depends on how well one performs academically more 
so than on how good one looks, changes in one’s academic performance are going to affect one’s 
self-esteem to a greater degree than changes in one’s physical appearance. 
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Findings from several studies show correspondence between trait domain-specific self-
esteem contingencies and trait domain-specific acceptance contingencies. First, there are strong 
positive correlations between how people rank importance of domains to their self-esteem and to 
relational evaluation (vanDellen, Hoy, & Hoyle, 2009). For example, those who rank highly 
importance of academics to their self-esteem also rank highly importance of academics to being 
accepted by individuals important to them. Further, measured at the level of trait self-esteem, 
people’s assessment of the importance of a given domain for gaining the approval of others has 
been shown to moderate the effect of people’s self-evaluation of their performance in the given 
domain on trait self-esteem for domains of competence, physical attractiveness, material 
possessions, and sociability (MacDonald et al. 2003). That is, people who do not deem 
themselves academically successful compared to their peers may experience lower self-esteem 
when they also believe that academic competence is important to being valued by important 
others than when they do not think academic competence matters to important others. 
Likewise, since the social environment tends to impose different acceptance 
contingencies on people occupying different social roles, membership in social roles moderates 
relationship between trait self-esteem and self-evaluations in domains of importance for 
acceptance in the social roles. For example, women, people in relationships, and those of East 
Asian descent have been found to be more likely than others to have their self-esteem contingent 
on possession of communal qualities such as kindness and warmth (Anthony et al., 2007). 
The associations between self-esteem and acceptance contingencies can also be 
evidenced in higher accessibility of acceptance and rejection words following primes of positive 
and negative appearance words in those with self-esteem contingent on appearance (vanDellen et 
al., 2009).  Moreover, those with self-esteem more contingent on academics have more biased 
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memory for events related to academic achievement as well as higher accessibility of words 
related to academic achievement following experience of social rejection (vanDellen, Hoy, 
Fernandez, & Hoyle, 2011). 
Relational Self and Situationally Activated Acceptance Contingencies 
 The connection between self-esteem contingencies and acceptance contingencies has 
been shown even with respect to situationally activated acceptance contingencies, including 
relationship-specific acceptance contingencies that are domain-specific (Horberg & Chen, 2010). 
This research largely builds on theorizing and findings that have been synthesized under the 
broad conceptual umbrella of relational self (“the self in relation to significant others”; Chen, 
Boucher, & Tapias, 2006, p. 151). 
Relational self. Relational self may be conceived of as a working self-concept (the self-
concept accessible at a given time; Markus & Wurf, 1987) that is constituted of an activated 
representation of self out of a repertoire of stored representations of self in relation to a variety of 
other people. An individual’s relational selves are assumed to differ in their level of relationship 
specificity (for example, the self in relation to one’s best friend Helen, one’s classmates, or 
people in general), the level to which they are chronically activated, and the conditions that may 
activate them situationally (Chen, Boucher, & Kraus, 2011). The components of relational self 
are assumed to be cognitive in nature, and thus subject to the same structural constraints and 
governing principles as any other knowledge structure (Higgins, 1996). 
Theorizing about the structure of cognitive representations of the interaction patterns 
between the self and others and about mechanisms through which these representations may 
influence affect, thoughts, and behaviors can be found in research on relational schemas 
(Baldwin, 1992, 1997). 
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Relational schemas. Baldwin (1992) defined relational schemas as “cognitive structures 
representing regularities in patterns of interpersonal relatedness” (p. 461). According to Baldwin 
(1992), the relational schemas include information about the self, others, and sets of scripts that 
take a form of if-then expectancies about others’ reactions to one’s behavior that develop based 
on experiences of past interactions. The relational schemas are specific to specific people, and 
become influential when the representation of the specific people is mentally activated, the 
imagined people becoming one’s private audience (Baldwin, 1997). For example, a student may 
have a relational schema for interacting with her teacher that includes expectancy that if she 
receives a poor grade, her teacher will belittle her. The student may have developed such a 
schema based on experienced or observed teacher’s criticism following intellectual performance 
or even inferred criticism based on experienced or observed praise following intellectual 
performance. Content of relational schemas concerning expectancies about others’ reactions is 
hypothesized to underlie patterns of responses in people’s self-esteem (Baldwin, 1997; Baldwin 
& Baccus, 2003). For example, the student with the relational schema connecting intellectual 
failure with teachers’ rejection may feel her self-esteem decline as she fails an exam (provided 
the schema is active) due to expectation of rejection from a valued significant other. Moreover, 
the primed person may even change her definition of what constitutes failure in the domain of 
acceptance contingency in the first place. For example, in one of the seminal studies on relational 
schemas, psychology graduate students were shown to evaluate their research ideas more 
negatively following a prime of their department chair known for his high standards than 
following a prime of a friendly postdoctoral scholar (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990). 
Situationally-activated acceptance contingencies. Acceptance contingencies can be 
induced through situational priming of close others. This demonstrates utility of studying 
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acceptance contingencies (rather than merely individual differences in levels or domains of self-
esteem contingencies). Namely, it helps to account for the process through which activations of 
other individuals may dynamically change manifestations of people’s need and motivation to be 
valued in ways that are specific to the activated acceptance contingencies. 
Domain-specific acceptance contingencies. Published research examining domain-
specific acceptance contingencies is extremely limited. To date, only a single study by Horberg 
and Chen (2010) has directly examined whether domains of self-esteem contingencies are 
relationship-specific attributes that can be changed through activation of distinct private 
audiences. In a series of 3 studies, the researchers subliminally primed participants with 
representations of their significant others, and then examined changes in their self-esteem 
contingencies (Study 1), state self-esteem following a success or failure in a competition domain 
(Study 2), and state self-esteem and relationship perceptions in an appearance domain (Study 3). 
Activation of representations of significant others shifted the participants’ self-esteem 
contingencies in the direction toward the domains in which the participants perceived that their 
significant others cared that the participants do well. 
Specifically, Horberg and Chen (2010) showed that after being primed with a word 
“father” (compared to being primed with a word “mailman”), participants reported that their self-
esteem depended more on the domains that they subsequently rated as the central domains in 
which their fathers cared that they succeeded; this relationship was moderated by participants’ 
desired closeness to their fathers, such that only participants who desired closeness to their 
fathers came to stake their self-esteem on the fathers’ central domains of acceptance contingency 
(Study 1). 
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In Study 2, participants who initially indicated that their self-esteem was not very 
affected by outperforming others but that their father cared whether they succeeded over other 
people reported to a greater extent that their self-esteem depended on succeeding over others 
after being primed with the word “father” (again, compared to a word “mailman”) and exhibited 
greater changes in self-esteem after succeeding (though strangely not after failing) in the 
relationship-relevant domain of competition. In this study, success and failure were manipulated 
by provision of items of differing difficulty and comparative feedback on the Remote Associates 
Task, which was presented as a measure of “an ability related to verbal competence and 
creativity but not necessarily to academic competence”. The lack of observed decrease after 
failing might have been explained by participants’ beliefs that relational value from their fathers 
could only be increased but not decreased via their performance but such a possibility was not 
assessed. 
Study 3 examined these effects in the domain of appearance. It showed greater changes in 
self-esteem following failure in the domain of physical appearance among participants who were 
primed with a name of a close other who cared about their appearance and with whom 
participants desired closeness (the failure induction took form of description of a physical feature 
participants disliked about themselves). Importantly, the changes in self-esteem in Study 3 
appeared to have been due to perceived changes in relational value: after failure, participants in 
the control condition (who had been primed with a bogus name-like word) exhibited positive 
correlation between desired closeness and current feelings of closeness with the close other but 
this correlation disappeared for participants primed with the close other who cared about their 
appearance. Thus, the study provided strong support for sociometer theory by indicating that 
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people monitor their relational value in relation to outcomes in activated acceptance 
contingencies. 
 Horberg and Chen (2010) also showed that individuals are capable of identifying close 
others who are seen as having only one central domain of acceptance contingency. Nearly all 
participants at least once assigned the highest rating on the scale (6 or 7 out of 7) of their father’s 
domains of acceptance contingency, and 45% of participants assigned this rating to only one 
domain of acceptance contingency (out of 14 domains which the participants rated). While the 
centrality of one domain of acceptance contingency might be characteristic of only this sample 
(undergraduate U.S. college students with majority Asian ethnicity) or a type of a relational 
figure (i.e., the participants’ father), this finding provided support for the possibility of guiding 
individuals to identify close others based on their central acceptance contingencies and 
intentionally activating them as their private audiences to obtain desired domain-targeted effects 
of acceptance contingencies. It also suggests the need to examine effects of acceptance 
contingencies in a domain-specific fashion rather than as relatively broader clusters of 
acceptance contingencies as was done in prior research (described below). 
 Extrinsic vs. intrinsic acceptance contingencies. Research on situationally-activated 
acceptance contingencies has otherwise focused on differentiating between extrinsic and intrinsic 
acceptance, or what has been also roughly correspondingly termed contingent and noncontingent 
acceptance (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; 
Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001). These distinctions can be traced back to self-
determination theory and related perspectives, which differentiate between self-esteem based on 
living up to standards (contingent self-esteem) and self-esteem based on simply being who one 
is, or being “true” to oneself (noncontingent or true self-esteem; Deci & Ryan, 1991). For 
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example, Deci and Ryan (1995) defined contingent self-esteem as “feelings about oneself that 
result from—indeed, are dependent on—matching some standard of excellence or living up to 
some interpersonal or intrapsychic expectations” and true self-esteem as something that is “more 
stable, more securely based in a solid sense of self” and that “developed as [one] acted 
autonomously within the context of authentic relationships” (p. 32). 
Some have argued (e.g., Arndt & Schimel, 2003; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001) that 
noncontingent self-esteem does not really exist because even acting authentically to oneself can 
be understood as a type of self-esteem contingency. The alternative terms—extrinsic vs. intrinsic 
self-esteem contingencies—can be seen as capturing this notion while both theoretically and 
empirically maintaining hypothesized differences between outcomes associated with these 
clusters of contingencies (for example, positive association between psychological well-being 
and intrinsic bases of self-esteem, Vonk & Smit, 2012). While this theoretical tradition 
conceptualizes intrinsic contingencies as a reflection of psychological well-being or a contributor 
to well-being by means of prompting pursuit of goals that fulfill people’s needs, intrinsic 
contingencies could also be seen as leading to higher, more resilient relational value due to 
greater abstractness of their requirements. Indeed, greater abstractness in construal of self-esteem 
contingencies has been shown to lead to greater self-esteem stability (Updegraff, Emanuel, Suh, 
& Gallagher, 2010). Accordingly, the tendency to positively self-evaluate on what tends to be 
classified as intrinsic contingencies emerges in both people with low and high self-esteem even 
though people with low self-esteem otherwise tend to evaluate themselves more critically 
(Anthony et al., 2007). Another possibility that has been suggested is that intrinsic bases of self-
esteem lead to perception of relational value that is more stable because individuals perceive 
these qualities as more stable (Schimel et al., 2001). 
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Situational activation of contingent vs. noncontingent acceptance contingencies provide 
additional support for responsiveness of self-esteem contingencies to primed relationships. For 
example, Baldwin and Sinclair (1996) asked participants to either provide initials of “a person 
who tends to be very accepting and nonevaluative of you and simply accepts you for who you 
are” (noncontingent acceptance condition) or “a person who tends to be very evaluative of you 
and seems to accept you only if you live up to certain standards of performance” (contingent 
acceptance condition) and visualize the person (Study 3). Following visualization of the 
contingently accepting person, the participants showed decreased reaction times to recognizing 
rejection words following failure words on a lexical decision task (compared to participants who 
visualized a noncontingently accepting person), suggesting activation of a schema connecting 
failure and rejection—a schema otherwise chronically evidenced in people with low trait self-
esteem (Study 1; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996). 
Research has also indirectly showed how this type of induction of acceptance 
contingency can exert motivational effects toward maintenance of relational value. Following 
visualization of a contingently accepting other (compared to a noncontingently accepting other), 
individuals were more likely to seek social comparison information when they were led to 
believe that others performed more poorly on what was presented as a test of social sensitivity 
(Study 1; Schimel et al., 2001). Assuming that the individuals’ relational value in the eyes of the 
contingently accepting private audience would be responsive to a variety of competence 
outcomes, ascertaining one’s superiority to others and avoiding information that might lead to 
disconfirmation of one’s competence might be one way of maintaining or augmenting one’s 
relational value. Similarly, visualization of a contingently accepting private audience (compared 
to a noncontingently accepting private audience) led participants to indicate greater amount of 
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externalizing attributions for what they believed to be their upcoming performance on a mental 
arithmetic task, thus enabling them to protect their relational value in case they performed poorly 
(Study 1; Arndt et al., 2002). 
These findings collectively illustrate how people’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors tend 
to take a form of what it takes to satisfy activated contingencies of relational value. 
Relational Value and Pursuit of Competence 
 As evidenced in the studies reviewed above, people may associate outcomes in a variety 
of domains with information about relational value (e.g., Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; vanDellen et 
al., 2011, 2009), and relational value can be impacted by outcomes in an activated domain of 
acceptance contingency (Horberg & Chen, 2010). Competence (academic, professional, athletic, 
and so on) may accordingly be seen as simply another broad domain in which success or failure 
may impact relational value and be pursued for the sake of it. More academically successful 
individuals may have higher relational value to teachers and peers who value academic 
achievement, more professionally successful individuals may have higher relational value to 
bosses and coworkers (or even to romantic partners), more skilled conversationalists may have 
higher relational value to their friends, and so on. Given the general perceived importance of 
competence for maintaining or increasing relational value (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2003), 
perceived competence in what is important to those close others with whom one desires 
closeness is particularly likely to become a target of pursuit of relational value (Leary & Allen, 
2011). 
Theorizing and evidence about what pursuit of competence in service of relational value 
may look like can be mostly found in research on individual differences in trait self-esteem 
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contingencies, which, as reviewed earlier, can be seen as proxy for trait acceptance contingencies 
(i.e., summative perceptions of what it takes to be valued by one’s close others). 
Research on trait self-esteem contingencies shows that students who report having their 
self-esteem contingent on academics experience increases in self-esteem following positive 
academic outcomes and decreases in self-esteem following negative academic outcomes 
(Crocker, Karpinski, et al., 2003; Crocker et al., 2002). This affective fluctuation may potentiate 
conscious motivation to approach emotional highs and avoid emotional lows associated with 
success and failure on academics. It could also result in nonconscious facilitation of goal pursuit 
by means of association of relationally valued goals with positive affect (Custers & Aarts, 2005). 
Accordingly, students who report having their self-esteem contingent on academics also report 
spending more time studying (Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). This corresponds to research on 
interpersonally activated acceptance contingencies, which shows that people assign greater 
importance to extrinsic goals such as financial success after being primed with acceptance based 
on extrinsic domains (Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). On the positive side, contingency on the domain 
may also produce increased self-efficacy due to people’s self-enhancing tendencies (i.e., 
tendencies to enhance relational value) because self-enhancement may take a form of increased 
perceived validity of the task when individuals experiences success (Leitner et al., 2013). 
But there is also evidence that having one’s self-esteem contingent on academics can put 
people under too much stress and increase their use of undesirable self-defensive strategies. 
Indeed, students with self-esteem contingent on academics perform worse on tasks described as 
diagnostic of academic ability compared to tasks described as non-diagnostic (Lawrence & 
Crocker, 2009); this relationship was shown to be mediated by increased anxiety that the 
contingent students experience under ability-diagnostic conditions (Lawrence & Williams, 
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2013). Students with self-esteem contingent on academics also report greater amount of 
academic problems such as conflicts with teaching assistants or professors, losing interest in 
learning, or perceiving that there is never enough time to meet all their obligations (Crocker & 
Luhtanen, 2003). As a caveat to such correlational findings, since students who experience 
difficulties in the domain of contingency experience more negative affect, it is possible that they 
are more likely to notice contingencies of their self-esteem, and thus to report them. Students 
whose self-esteem is more contingent on academics further exhibit greater tendencies to self-
handicap. For example, students who held an incremental theory of intelligence and had highly 
contingent self-esteem on academics were more likely to choose to listen to performance-
impairing music and to withhold effort on a difficult compared to an easy ability-diagnostic task, 
a pattern that was not obtained for students low on self-esteem contingency on academics (Niiya, 
Brook, & Crocker, 2010). 
This line of research thus indicates that while students with self-esteem contingent on 
academics may have extra motivation to do well, their efforts may be offset by self-handicapping 
and anxiety. Anxiety may be more likely to be expected under conditions feared to threaten self-
esteem (i.e., relational value) because social anxiety is hypothesized to arise from expectation of 
making an undesirable social impression and desire to avoid making that impression (Schlenker 
& Leary, 1982). The same applies for self-handicapping, which is generally assumed to result 
when individuals fear that decrease in relational value is likely unless they set up excuses for the 
potential failure. It is therefore possible to presume that the negative effects associated with self-
esteem contingencies on academics will manifest predominantly under conditions when decrease 
in relational value is perceived as likely. 
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Support for this proposition can evidenced in research that examined effects of upward 
vs. downward self-esteem contingencies (that is, increase in self-esteem following success vs. 
decrease in self-esteem following failure; Vonk & Smit, 2012). This research has shown 
downward extrinsic self-esteem contingencies to be negatively predictive of all indicators of 
well-being used in the study (such as a measure of positive and negative affect, a measure of 
self-compassion, or a measure of personal well-being that included items related to having 
purpose in life, positive relationships with others, feelings of autonomy, and so on) but showed 
upward extrinsic contingencies to be either unrelated to well-being or only weakly negatively 
correlated with it (Vonk & Smit, 2012). The relational analogue to upward and downward self-
esteem contingencies would be increase in relational value following success (i.e., upward 
acceptance contingency) vs. decrease in relational value following failure (i.e., downward 
acceptance contingency). For example, if a student’s grandmother had only an upward 
acceptance contingency on academic achievement, the student’s bad grade would have little 
impact on his relational value when the grandmother is his private audience but the student might 
increase his relational value if he received a good grade. This might make the student relatively 
resistant to self-handicapping or anxiety but still give him extra motivation to strive for academic 
excellence. 
Positive effects of self-esteem contingencies on motivation (even in the presence of 
downward acceptance contingencies) may also be expected when one is operating under non-
evaluative conditions or works on tasks which are perceived as within one’s control (effort-
dependent tasks or tasks for which one has sufficiently high self-efficacy). 
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Chapter 3: Present Studies 
Overview of Present Studies  
To summarize, since self-esteem can be seen as an indicator of relational value (Leary et 
al., 1995), domains on which self-esteem is contingent can be seen as indicators of domains on 
which relational value is contingent. Prior research has showed that subliminally activating 
cognitive representations of a close other can shift bases of people’s self-esteem toward domains 
perceived to affect their relational value in the eyes’ of the close other (Horberg & Chen, 2010). 
This demonstrates that (1) contingencies of self-esteem can also be understood as states that are 
responsive to activations of representations of close others, and suggests that (2) correlational 
findings between trait self-esteem contingencies and various outcomes of interest might be 
caused by need and motivation for relational value (doing what one thinks it tends to take to be 
valued by close others in one’s life) rather than strivings for self-esteem per se. 
The present studies investigated whether changing bases of relational value via activation 
of cognitive representations of a close other may produce effects that correspond to those 
observed in the research on trait self-esteem contingencies. Of importance to the present studies, 
when self-esteem contingencies have been investigated as a personality trait in prior research, 
basing self-esteem on academics has been linked to self-reports of greater anxiety about 
intellectual performance (Lawrence & Williams, 2013) and self-reports of increased study time 
(Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). Analogously, the present studies investigated whether inducing 
contingency of relational value on a domain leads to increased self-reported anxiety about 
performance on a task evaluative of one’s performance in that domain (Study 1), and whether it 
guides individuals to exert effort toward improving themselves in that domain (Study 2). By 
gathering some additional data on perceptions of the activated close others as well as participant 
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characteristics that may heighten sensitivity to acceptance contingencies, the present studies also 
examined relational factors that may moderate these effects (such as desired closeness to the 
close other or perceived potential for loss of relational value given one’s incompetence). 
Overview of Methods 
Data about participants’ characteristics and their close others who fit a given profile of 
acceptance contingency (competence, physical appearance, and intrinsic acceptance 
contingency) were gathered in a prescreening survey (Survey 1). Instructions for identifying the 
close other were adapted from procedure used by Baldwin and Sinclair (1996) in a way that 
captured targeted domain-specificity. 
After a delay of several days, participants were invited for a follow-up survey (Survey 2). 
Using a between-group experimental design, a visualization of a close other (identified in 
advance in the prescreening survey as possessing specified acceptance contingencies) was used 
to induce acceptance contingent on either competence, physical appearance, or intrinsic qualities 
(i.e., noncontingent acceptance). Following the visualization, self-reported anxiety about taking 
an anticipated intelligence test was measured in Study 1, and effort and intention to exert effort 
toward improving one’s intelligence were measured in Study 2. 
Hypotheses 
Hypotheses for the two studies were formulated as follows. 
Study 1 (H1). Controlling for baseline trait self-esteem contingency on academics and 
gender, those who will visualize a close other whose acceptance is perceived to be contingent on 
intelligence will report greater anxiety about upcoming intelligence test than those in the other 
visualization conditions (acceptance contingent on physical appearance, intrinsic acceptance). 
This relationship will be moderated by desired closeness, such that individuals with higher 
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desired closeness will be more affected by the acceptance contingency (i.e., experience greater 
anxiety when in a task-relevant acceptance contingency condition). 
These results were predicted because activation of the domain of acceptance contingency 
that matches the domain of the anticipated evaluative performance may augment the extent to 
which the evaluative performance may affect one’s relational value. The hypothesis was based 
on multiple sources, including theorizing that test anxiety has origins in social evaluation 
(Covington, 2009; Schlenker & Leary, 1982), evidence that social anxiety can be ameliorated by 
expectation of being accepted rather than rejected (Baldwin & Main, 2001), or evidence of the 
link between self-esteem contingency on academics and anxiety about intellectual performance 
(Lawrence & Williams, 2013). 
Prior research (e.g., Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Schimel, Arndt, 
Banko, & Cook, 2004; Vonk & Smit, 2012) has frequently operated under the assumption that 
any form of acceptance besides acceptance for “who one truly is” (i.e., acceptance based on 
intrinsic qualities) undermines the feeling that one’s level of being accepted is stable, and that 
this feeling of instability potentiates negative affect, or potentiates defensiveness to reduce the 
negative affect whenever one is in evaluative situation. In contrast, the present work assumed 
that these effects are primarily linked to specific situations that may result in changes to 
relational value. For example, a person may believe that her mother’s acceptance of her is based 
solely on her career success and that her husband’s acceptance is based on how good she looks 
but not on her career success. If the primary difference is in perception of whether one’s 
acceptance is stable, the woman after seeing a picture of a supermodel might be predicted to be 
similarly anxious about looking into a mirror when she thinks about her mother as when she 
thinks about her husband because her mother’s acceptance is potentially unstable. However, if 
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the primary difference is in anticipation of changes in relational value with respect to evaluative 
situations within the domain of acceptance contingency, thinking about her mother might not 
have the same effect on the woman’s anxiety as would thinking about her husband. Since the 
present studies assumed the latter (i.e., effects of contingent valuing are domain-specific), the 
hypothesis stated that both activation of acceptance contingent on intrinsic qualities and physical 
appearance (i.e., task-irrelevant domain) would lead to less anxiety than activation of acceptance 
based on intellectual competence (task-relevant domain). 
A threat to the design involving imagining of a close other with contingent valuing of the 
subject is the subject’s desire for closeness with the imagined other. As in past studies using 
primes of other individuals (e.g., Horberg & Chen, 2010), there was hypothesized to be an 
interaction between visualized acceptance contingency condition and desired closeness with the 
visualized individual, with greater closeness leading to greater anxiety about being evaluated by 
the close other whose acceptance is contingent on intellectual competence. 
Because anxiety was measured only with self-reports, it was not possible to rule out the 
possibility that the self-reports reflected claimed self-handicapping (in this case, claiming anxiety 
in order to render performance on the evaluative task less diagnostic; Smith, Snyder, & 
Handelsman, 1982) rather than anxiety. If the self-reports reflected claimed self-handicapping, 
Study 1 could be partially seen as an attempt at conceptually replicating Arndt et al.’s (2002) 
finding that visualizing contingently accepting close other (compared to noncontingently 
accepting one) increases externalizing attributions for performance on an anticipated mental 
arithmetic task (externalizing attributions can be seen as another form of claimed self-
handicapping). Regardless of whether self-reported anxiety reflected claimed self-handicapping, 
the direction of the hypothesized results would remain the same in as much as the desire to 
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protect one’s relational value in the close other’s eyes and uncertainty about being able to do so 
might give rise to both increased self-handicapping and anxiety. 
Study 2 (H2). Controlling for reading speed, people will exert more effort and will report 
intention to exert more effort toward improving their intelligence after visualizing a close other 
whose acceptance is perceived to be contingent on intellectual competence. This relationship will 
be moderated by desired closeness, such that individuals with higher desired closeness will be 
more affected by the acceptance contingency (i.e., exert greater effort when in a task-relevant 
acceptance contingency condition). 
The hypothesis built on support from many sources, including findings of greater self-
reported study time among students with self-esteem more contingent on academics (Crocker, 
Luhtanen, et al., 2003), evidence of using competence pursuit as a way of increasing belonging 
(Jamieson, Harkins, & Williams, 2010) and enacting achievement goals for social means (Urdan 
& Mestas, 2006), or theorizing that links pursuit of relational value to a variety of thoughts and 
behaviors that appear to be enacted in its service (e.g., Covington, 2009; Leary & Baumeister, 
2000). 
While under certain circumstances tasks linked with one’s intelligence might result in 
defensive withdrawal of effort, this study was designed to avoid such inferred linkages by the 
subjects: a task involving reading about possibilities for improving one’s intelligence with no 
evaluative component should diminish performance concerns and the corresponding tendency to 
withdraw effort. It was also deemed a suitable task for improving one’s relational value in the 
domain of intellectual competence for both people who perceive that their close other’s 
acceptance is contingent on intellectual ability per se, and those who perceive that it is contingent 
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on one’s level of intellectual competence (which may be enhanced by improved intellectual 
ability). 
  
28 
 
Chapter 4: Methods 
Both studies consisted of two surveys separated in administration by at least five days. 
Survey 1 served for gathering information about participants and their close others. At the 
beginning of Survey 2, participants were primed with a randomly assigned close other (one 
whose acceptance was perceived as intrinsic vs. contingent on appearance vs. contingent on 
competence) by means of a visualization exercise. In Study 1, participants’ anxiety about an 
intelligence test was subsequently measured; in study 2, participants’ effort toward improving 
their intelligence was subsequently measured. Figure 1 displays a simplified schema of this 
between-group experimental design. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schema of the experimental design for Study 1 and Study 2  
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Study 1: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety 
Participants. Members of the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce participated 
in the study by completing online surveys (Survey 1, Survey 2) in exchange for monetary 
compensation. Participants received $2.25 for completion of Survey 1, and $1.10 for completion 
of Survey 2. Similar to other studies using MTurk (e.g., Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016), 
participation was limited to individuals located in the U.S. who completed more than 100 
assignments on the Mechanical Turk in the past and have been approved by requesters in over 
90% of cases (these qualifications are based on data maintained about the workers by MTurk).  
Minimum sample size of 179 was determined based on power calculation for contrasting 
3 groups with desired power of .80 and anticipated effect of F = 0.25 using G*Power (Faul et al., 
2007) software. To protect against unexpectedly high attrition and insufficient number of 
participants passing screening criteria in Survey 1, 291 participants were assigned for Survey 1 
for this study (Survey 1 data collection was joint for Study 1 and Study 2; the total number of 
recruited participants for Survey 1 for both studies was 661; 543 participants passed screening 
criteria for eligibility for invitation for Survey 2; of the 543 participants, a randomly selected 
subset of 291 was assigned for Study 1, and the rest, 252, for Study 2—more participants were 
recruited for Study 1 than Study 2 because of lower costs of Survey 2). Because it was assumed 
that attrition would be overestimated yet budgetary constraints precluded inclusion of all eligible 
participants who completed Survey 1 and might wish to participate in Survey 2, a stopping rule 
for Survey 2 data collection was determined in advance of the start of Survey 2 at 221 
participants (preregistered at osf.io/93kfx; note that actual number of collected responses was 
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222, probably because one of the participants completed the survey but did not submit it on 
MTurk, so he or she was included in the downloaded survey responses). 
Participants were excluded from receiving invitation for Survey 2 for any of the 
following reasons: inability to identify three unique individuals for the profiles of acceptance 
contingencies (for example, reusing a single name multiple times or writing “NA” or “myself), 
use of nonsense words or strings of letters for provided reasoning for selecting close others for 
given profiles of acceptance contingencies, failure to pass second attention check (the first 
attention check was not used at it appeared that participants might have had troubles 
understanding it), suspicion of a single person using different worker accounts (use of the same 
names of close others in the survey in conjunction with accessing the survey at about the same 
time), failure to reclassify identified closes others for the same description of acceptance 
contingency at the beginning and end of the survey. Application of these criteria screened out 
18% of participants from eligibility for Survey 2. 
Survey 2 participants were excluded from analyses if they did not answer affirmatively 
that they recognized the name of the close other they were asked to visualize in Survey 2 or if 
they did not recall what type of a test they were told they would take (i.e., an intelligence test). 
As only participants who passed these two checks were used for analyses (as per preregistered 
order of prioritization of checks, osf.io/93kfx), sample characteristics are subsequently provided 
only for these participants (N = 194). 
Participants who classified themselves as females composed 57.7% of the sample. In 
terms of ethnicity, 79.4% of the participants classified themselves as White, 10.8% as Black or 
African American, 5.7% as Asian, and 0.5% as American Indian or Alaska Native. In terms of 
age, 41.2% participants reported being 18-34 years old, 42.7% being 35-54 years old,  and 15.4% 
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being 55-74 years old. Participants reported being employed full-time in 56.2% of cases, being 
employed part-time in 16.5% of cases, and being a student in 5.2% of cases. Nearly all 
participants claimed native English fluency (96.4% of participants). Participants reported having 
a college degree in 40.7% of cases, and having completed some postgraduate work or degree in 
20.1% of cases. 
 Procedure. The study consisted of two surveys, a prescreening survey (Survey 1) and a 
survey with the manipulation of acceptance contingency and measure of anxiety (Survey 2).  
Administration of the surveys was separated by 5-11 days (depending on how soon from the 
posting of the surveys participants answered each of the surveys). After giving their consent, 
participants read that survey examines connections between personality and characteristics of 
social environment, and that they may be later offered a chance for a follow-up. In the survey, 
participants first responded to questions related to their trait contingency of self-esteem on 
academics, their self-evaluation of competence and appearance, as well as one-item question 
about their need to belong (additional filler questions and one attention check were inserted). 
Then they identified one of their close others for each of three given profiles of acceptance 
contingencies (physical appearance acceptance contingency, competence acceptance 
contingency, intrinsic contingency) and provided justification for their selection. After 
identification of their close others, participants answered a series of questions about each of the 
identified close others (the extent to which their acceptance is intrinsic, contingent on physical 
appearance, and contingent on competence; desired closeness to the close others; frequency of 
thinking about the close others; etc.; one attention check was included among these questions). 
Finally, participants answered a few demographic questions about themselves and completed a 
task that asked them to assign the names of the close others they provided earlier in the survey 
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again to the given descriptions of acceptance contingencies. The survey ended with thanking for 
participation and a survey code for obtaining monetary reimbursement. 
 After a minimum of 5 days, participants who satisfied selection criteria based on the data 
in the prescreening survey received an email that they qualified to take part in another paid task 
on MTurk. To prioritize participation by individuals who were able to identify close others who 
were a good fit for the target criteria, participants who answered that the close other identified 
for competence acceptance contingency evaluates them to a greater extent based on competence 
than the close other identified for appearance acceptance contingency does received the email 
several hours in advance of the other participants (because of how the survey was set up though, 
all eligible participants had access to the survey once it was released, i.e., a few minutes before 
the first batch of participants received the email). The email stated that they qualified to complete 
a follow-up survey to the survey that they already completed, and another unrelated survey. A 
hyperlink was given to the survey with a description that it combines the two unrelated surveys 
for which the participants qualified. 
 The introduction to the survey 2 reiterated that participants would take part in two 
ostensibly unrelated studies and mentioned that the first study concerns people’s visualization 
ability and the second development of a new measure of intellectual aptitude. The introduction 
was followed by a bogus task that included visualization of an animal and a task designed to 
activate representations of close others modeled on visualization tasks used in prior studies (e.g., 
Baldwin & Holmes, 1987). The visualization task corresponded to one of three conditions into 
which participants were randomly assigned: competence (visualization of Competence 
Acceptor), physical appearance (visualization of Appearance Acceptor), or intrinsic acceptance 
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contingency (visualization of Intrinsic Acceptor). Then, participants read that they completed the 
first study and are now about to answer questions for the second study. 
The ostensible “second study” was introduced as testing reliability of a few new items for 
a short well-established test designed to measure intelligence in adults. The well-established test 
was presented as a significant predictor of one’s intellectual achievements (in academic and 
professional settings) as well as one’s ability to reason logically in everyday situations.  
Participants also read that feedback would be provided after they complete the test but that first 
they needed to answer a few questions about themselves and how they feel about taking the test. 
After these instructions, participants completed measures for anxiety and state self-
esteem. Then, they were invited to guess what they think the study investigated and respond to a 
few checks for their responses. At the end, participants were informed that no actual intelligence 
testing would take place and were debriefed about the purpose of the study (that it assessed 
anxiety about an anticipated intelligence test following visualization of a close other who did vs. 
did not care about one’s competence), thanked for their participation, and awarded a survey code 
to receive monetary reimbursement. 
Materials (survey 1). 
Trait contingency of self-esteem on intellectual competence. Participants responded to 
an adaptation of a five-item academic competence subscale of Contingencies of Self-Worth 
Scale (Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). This measure (α = .81) served to control for potential 
differences in the level of trait self-esteem contingency between experimental groups. 
Sample original items: “I feel better about myself when I know I’m doing well 
academically”; “My opinion about myself isn’t tied to how well I do in school” (reverse scored). 
Two of the items refer to whether participants agree that their self-esteem depends on academic 
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performance; two items refer to whether their self-esteem goes up when they do well 
academically, and one item refers to whether their self-esteem goes down when they do poorly 
academically. Participants rate their agreement with the statements on a 7-point scale (1 = 
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree). This measure has been shown to have an 
acceptable level of reliability for the timespan within which it is used in the present study (test-
retest correlation of .74 after 3 months; Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). The predictive validity 
of the measure can be evidenced by its ability to predict changes in self-esteem in response to 
academic outcomes (e.g., Crocker, Karpinski, et al., 2003). 
The instructions for responding to the items stated that if individuals have not 
experienced the described situation, they should answer how they think they would feel if it 
occurred (Crocker, Luhtanen, et al., 2003). This should have made it possible to answer the items 
for individuals who were not students. 
Self-evaluation of competence and appearance. Participants indicated agreement with 
four items for perceived competence (e.g., “I am competent”; α = .90) and four items for 
perceived appearance (e.g., “My facial features are attractive”; α = .80) on a 7-point scale: 1 = 
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree (Lemay & Clark, 2008). 
Need to belong. Need to belong was assessed with a single item “I have a strong need to 
belong” (this item showed good validity and test-rest reliability in prior research, Nichols & 
Webster, 2013). Participants indicated their agreement with the statement on a 7-point scale: 1 = 
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree. 
Attention check 1. Participants’ attention to instructions was evaluated based on selection 
of Strongly agree in response to “I focus. Pick strongly agree for this item.” 
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Filler items. Five additional questions about personality traits were included to disguise 
the purpose of the research. For example, participants were asked to indicate agreement on a 7-
point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree) with items such as “I see 
myself as open to new experiences and complex” (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). 
Identification of close others matching target profiles of acceptance contingencies. 
Participants were then instructed to think about people who are close or important to them and 
whom they think about frequently. In order to identify individuals who would be used as primes 
of acceptance contingencies in Survey 2, the participants were next instructed to pick one unique 
individual who would be the best match for each provided description (i.e., descriptions of 
acceptance contingencies). To protect participants’ identity, participants were instructed to use 
the people’s first names (with the initial for the last name if necessary; e.g., Jane L.), nicknames 
(e.g., mom), or initials (e.g., JL). 
The description for the appearance acceptance contingency stated, “This person tends to 
mainly evaluate me based on my physical appearance (for example, how good my face or my 
body looks) and the extent to which I live up to his or her standards of physical appearance 
greatly influences how much he or she likes me.” The description for competence acceptance 
contingency stated, “This person tends to mainly evaluate me based on my competence (for 
example, based on how smart I am or how good I am at work or school) and the extent to which I 
live up to his or her standards of competence greatly influences how much he or she likes me.”  
And, finally, the description for intrinsic acceptance contingency stated, “This person tends to be 
accepting and nonevaluative of me and simply likes me for who I am.” 
These descriptions were modeled based on descriptions used in prior research that 
manipulated contingent (~extrinsic) vs. noncontingent (~intrinsic) acceptance contingencies and 
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successfully obtained outcomes theorized to correspond to the contingencies following 
visualization of close others identified based on the descriptions (e.g., Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; 
Schimel et al., 2001; Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). The descriptions used in the prior research were: 
“a person who clearly likes you, tends to be evaluative of you, and seems to accept you only to 
the extent that you live up to certain standards of performance” for contingent acceptance, and “a 
person who clearly likes you, tends to be very accepting and non-evaluative of you, and simply 
accepts you for who you are” for noncontingent acceptance (note: the descriptor “who clearly 
likes you” has been added only in Arndt et al., 2002). 
For each given description of acceptance contingency, participants were instructed to 
provide justification for why they selected the particular close other. 
Relational perceptions. Once participants identified the three close others, they answered 
a series of questions about the close others. These questions were designed to be used mainly for 
exploratory purposes to see whether they interact with the visualization condition on the main 
dependent variables because, for example, Horberg and Chen (2010), showed interaction 
between primed close other and desired closeness on shifting participants’ self-esteem 
contingency toward the close other’s central domain. These questions were also included to 
assist with evaluation of potential alternative explanations for findings. 
Fit of the close other for target acceptance contingencies. The fit of the identified close 
others for the target acceptance contingency and potential contamination with non-target 
acceptance contingency for each of the close others were evaluated with question items as 
follows. Participants indicated their agreement that their close other “tends to be very evaluative 
of [their, i.e., participants’] physical appearance,” “tends to be very evaluative of [their] 
competence (for example, of how smart [they are] or how good [they are] at work or school,” 
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and “clearly accepts [them] just for who [they are].” The ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1 
= Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree). 
Type of relationship to the close other. Participants were asked to classify the type of 
relationship they have to each of the individuals they selected: “How would you describe [name 
of the identified close other]'s current relationship to you?” The response options included: 
Acquaintance (not school- or career-related), Friend (not related to school or your career), 
Romantic partner, Family member (not a romantic partner), Professional relationship (for 
example, a colleague or a supervisor), School-related relationship (for example, a classmate or 
a teacher), Other (specify). 
Index of desired closeness to the close other. Desired closeness to each of the close other 
was assessed with three items (α = .92 for Intrinsic Acceptor; α = .94 for Appearance Acceptor; α 
= .88 for Competence Acceptor); the answers to the items were averaged to obtain the index. 
Participants answered the question “How close do you WANT to be to [name of the selected 
close other]?” using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all close, 5 = Moderately close; 7 = Extremely 
close); the question, “How important is it for you feel valued by [name of the selected close 
other]?” using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all important, 5 = Moderately important, 7 = Extremely 
important); and question “How valued do you WANT to be by [name of the selected close 
other]?” using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all valued, 5 = Moderately valued, 7 = Extremely 
valued). 
Frequency of thinking about the close other. Participants were asked: “On average, how 
often did you think about [name of the selected close other] over the last 30 days?” The response 
options were as follows: 1 = Never, 2 = Less than once a week, 3 = Once a week, 4 = 4-6 times a 
week, 5 = Daily. 
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The close other’s evaluation of the participant’s intelligence and appearance. Two 
questions assessed whether the close other considers the participants unintelligent (reverse-
scored) and intelligent (α = .79 for Intrinsic Acceptor; α = .85 for Appearance Acceptor; α = .84 
for Competence Acceptor), and not good looking (reverse-scores) and good looking (Lemay & 
Clark, 2008). Participants indicated agreement with the statements on a 7-point scale (1 = 
Strongly disagree, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Strongly agree). 
Upward and downward acceptance contingencies. Participants indicated how they 
believed their relationship with each of the three close others (i.e., those selected as matching the 
descriptions of acceptance contingencies) would be affected if they suddenly improved in each 
of the targeted domains of acceptance contingencies (i.e., perceived upward acceptance 
contingency in the domain) and if they suddenly became worse (i.e., perceived downward 
acceptance contingency in the domain). That is, they answered a total of 18 questions about 
acceptance contingencies (two questions per three domains per three close others). 
Specifically, to measure upward acceptance contingency on intellectual competence, 
participants were asked: “Imagine that by magic you suddenly became much more intelligent, 
competent, talented, or skilled than you currently are. How would it influence how much [name 
of the selected individual] values you as a person?” The words “became much more intelligent, 
competent, talented, or skilled” (the phrase “intelligent, competent, talented, and skilled” was 
used to measure competence acceptance contingency in MacDonald et al., 2003) were replaced 
with “became much more good-looking” for measuring upward contingency on appearance and 
by “started to act much more true to yourself” for measuring upward intrinsic contingency. For 
downward acceptance contingencies, the word “more” were replaced with “less” (e.g., “became 
much less intelligent, competent, talented or skilled”). Participants answered the items about the 
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changes in relational value on a 7-point scale (1 = Would value me much less, 4 = Would value 
me still the same, 7 = Would value me much more). The measure of downward acceptance 
contingency was reverse scored. 
Attention check 2. Participants’ attention to instructions was evaluated based on selection 
of Strongly agree in response to “I focus. Pick strongly agree for this item.” 
Re-matching the identified close others to their assigned acceptance contingencies. To 
ensure that participants selected close others who they would reliably recognize as matching the 
acceptance contingency for which the participants identified them, participants were again 
presented with each of the descriptions of acceptance contingencies. For each of the descriptions, 
the names of the three identified close others were displayed, and participants were asked to pick 
which of the close others fits the description best. 
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their gender, age, ethnicity, 
educational level, employment status, and English proficiency using several listed options. For 
ethnicity and employment status, participants were able to endorse multiple options. Option to 
decline to answer the question was provided for each of the questions. 
Materials (survey 2).  
Visualization task 1 (cover story). To reinforce the cover story that the first part of the 
survey examined visualization, participants were first instructed to spend 15 seconds imagining 
an exotic animal and how they are feeding it. Then, they answered several questions about the 
visualization (which animal they visualized, which food they fed the animal, how vivid their 
visualization was, etc.) 
Visualization task 2 (activation of acceptance contingencies). To make the second 
visualization task used for experimental manipulation of acceptance contingencies fit within the 
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cover story of the first part of the survey, the task was framed to participants as involving 
visualization of something from their life that they are more familiar with (making it seem as if 
the familiarity dimension of the object to be visualized was of interest to the study). The 
participants were informed that they listed a name of a close other in one of past surveys they 
took, and that they would be asked to visualize this person for this exercise. 
Participants were randomly assigned into one of the three conditions of acceptance 
contingencies (i.e., competence, appearance, or intrinsic contingency). The close other’s name 
from Survey 1 corresponding to the acceptance contingency condition to which participants were 
assigned was then used as a basis for the visualization. The visualization served the purpose of 
activating cognitive representations of the close other (and his or her acceptance contingencies). 
While this approach slightly differed from some prior research in which people were asked to 
visualize a person identified based on the description of acceptance contingencies within the 
same study session (e.g., Sheldon & Kasser, 2008)—which might have resulted in more direct 
manipulation of acceptance contingencies—, merely asking people to think of the close others 
(without direct mention of acceptance contingencies in close temporal proximity to measurement 
of dependent variables) might have been a more ecologically valid way of assessing effects of 
daily thoughts about close others and cues that might remind people of them. 
The visualization approximated procedure originally developed by Baldwin and Holmes 
(1987). For example, participants were asked to focus attention on the person, picture his or her 
face, and imagine hearing his or her voice. Then they were asked several questions regarding the 
visualization (e.g., rating vividness of the visualization, describing the voice of the close other 
they imagined in the visualization, indicating the close other’s hair color) whose purpose was to 
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reinforce the cover story about examining visualization and further activate mental 
representation of the close other. 
Anxiety. Using a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Strongly agree), participants 
responded to two items: “I feel anxious about taking this test” and “I feel distressed and uneasy 
about taking this test” (α = .89; Lawrence & Williams, 2013; originally adapted from Sarason, 
1984). This measure was selected in this study because it was used in prior research to show that 
anxiety mediates the association between self-esteem contingencies on academics and worsened 
performance under ability-diagnostic conditions (Lawrence & Williams, 2013). 
Filler items. As in Survey 1, participants answered several filler personality questions to 
conceal the purpose of the questions. 
State self-esteem.  Two measures of state self-esteem were used: Self-Liking subscale of 
Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale-Revised Version (α = .95; SLCS-R; Tafarodi & Swann, 
2001) adapted for measurement as a state, and a measure of self-evaluative emotions (α = .77; 
Arndt et al., 2002; Leary et al., 1995). While the measures were slightly different from those 
used by Horberg and Chen (2010), the choice of two measures for state self-esteem followed the 
same rationale—that self-evaluative emotions may be more contextually sensitive. State self-
esteem was measured to see whether participants in intellectual competence contingency 
experienced lower self-esteem than participants in other conditions (assuming that individuals 
have a tendency to doubt their intelligence when facing an intellectual assessment, their self-
esteem might decrease more following activation of acceptance contingent on intellectual 
competence; similarly, following activation of this type of acceptance contingency, participants 
in Study 2 might experience greater increase in their self-esteem after working to improve their 
intelligence). 
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SLCS-R is a measure developed to better capture the two factor nature of the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)—that is, to differentiate between items that capture one’s 
perception of competence (corresponding to Self-Competence subscale in SLCS-R) and those 
that capture one’s perception of being loveable (corresponding to Self-Liking subscale in SLCS-
R; Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). Prior research has supported reliability and validity of the measure 
(e.g., Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). The Self-Liking subscale was selected because it is theorized 
(Tafarodi & Swann, 1995) to be more closely tied to perception of being socially accepted than 
the Self-Competence subscale (for a discussion of how common measures of self-esteem may 
not cleanly assess self-esteem, see also Leary & Baumeister, 2000). The Self-Liking subscale 
includes eight items. Sample items include “I am very comfortable with myself” and “I do not 
have enough respect for myself” (reverse scored). Participants rate their answers on a 5-point 
scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). To convert the measure into measuring state 
self-esteem, participants were asked to respond to items with respect to how they feel “right 
now” and adverbs like “never” (which refer to the past feelings) were not used. Asking people to 
make judgments about items measuring self-esteem with respect to “right now” is a common 
practice in measurement of state self-esteem (e.g., Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). 
 Self-evaluative emotions were measured by asking participants to rate how they feel right 
now using a 7-point scale with the following adjectives (summed into an index of self-evaluative 
emotions): good–bad, proud–ashamed, valuable–worthless, and loved–unloved (as in Leary et 
al., 1995, with a switch from happy–dejected to loved–unloved as in Arndt et al., 2002). As 
evidence of validity of these feelings in terms of their reflection of being valued, rankings of how 
approvingly others would react to various outcomes have been shown to correlate with the index 
(Leary et al., 1995). 
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 Attention check. Participants’ attention to instructions was evaluated based on selection 
of Somewhat agree in response to “I read instructions. Select somewhat agree for this item.” 
Hypothesis guessing. Participants were asked to type if based on the questions they had 
completed so far they had any guesses about what the study investigated, and if so, to state what 
those guesses were. 
Careful reading of questions. Participants responded to a question, “How carefully have 
you read all the instructions and questions in this survey so far?” Five options were provided: 1 = 
Not at all carefully, 3 = Moderately carefully, 5 = Extremely carefully. Participants were asked to 
answer the question honestly (it was emphasized that their compensation does not depend on the 
answer to the question). 
Number of breaks taken. Participants were asked, “How much time in total did you 
spend taking a break (for example, to answer a phone call or read an email) while completing the 
study?” They selected from the following options: 0 minutes, 1-5 minutes, 10-20 minutes, 20 
minutes or more. 
Manipulation checks. As manipulation checks, participants were asked to select among 
several options to see whether they could recall the type of test they were told they would take 
(i.e., test of intelligence) and type the name of the close other they were asked to visualize. 
Re-matching the identified close others to their assigned acceptance contingencies. To 
check whether the visualized close other would still be classified as fitting the acceptance 
contingency it was assumed to represent, participants were again presented with each of the 
descriptions of acceptance contingencies and asked to select the name of the close other (out of 
the three names they provided in Survey 1) who best fits each of the descriptions. 
Study 2: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort 
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 Participants. Participants were selected for Survey 2 in Study 2 the same way they were 
selected in Study 1. Identical considerations were applied for determining minimum sample size. 
The data collection for Study 2 was stopped at 189 participants. Because application of the first 
exclusion criterion (confirmation of having recognized the name of the close other in the 
visualization task) already dropped the number of participants beyond the minimum sample size 
that was calculated, no other exclusion criteria were applied. The subsequent sample 
characteristics are provided only for these participants (N = 173). 
Participants who classified themselves as females composed 54.3% of the sample. In 
terms of ethnicity, 80.9% of the participants classified themselves as White, 9.2% as Black or 
African American, 5.8% as Asian, and 2.3% as American Indian or Alaska Native. In terms of 
age, 43.4% participants reported being 18-34 years old, 42.7% being 35-54 years old,  and 13.9% 
being 55-74 years old. Participants reported being employed full-time in 61.8% of cases, being 
employed part-time in 16.2% of cases, and being a student in 3.5% of cases. Nearly all 
participants claimed native English fluency (97.1% of participants). Participants reported having 
a college degree in 40.5% of cases, and having completed some postgraduate work or degree in 
14.5% of cases. 
Procedure. The second study consisted of two surveys whose administration was 
separated by 5-11 days. The first survey was identical to the survey 1 in Study 1. The same 
procedure as in Study 1 was used for contacting participants to take the second survey. In the 
second survey, participants underwent the same visualization tasks aimed at activating 
acceptance contingencies as in Study 1 according to one of the three acceptance contingency 
conditions into which they were randomly assigned. The visualization tasks were followed by 
introduction to the second part of the survey for the ostensibly separate study. 
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The second part of the survey was presented as a study that examined suitability of 
background reading materials for an intelligence training program. Participants were told that 
they would be asked to provide their impressions of the materials and answer a few questions 
about themselves. Then, they had a chance to read the materials. After reading the first article on 
the possibility of growing their intelligence, participants answered several questions about their 
perceptions of the article (these questions served primarily for reinforcement of the cover story). 
Afterwards, participants were asked whether they would like to receive by email free access to 
materials with exercises for training intelligence (and if yes, how extensive a training package 
they would prefer). The choice of the package served as a measure of intentions to exert effort 
toward improving intelligence. After they made a selection, participants were also told that on 
the next page they would have an opportunity to read and subsequently evaluate one additional 
reading but that once the page loads, they can skip the reading and evaluating if they wish. The 
reading times on the articles were used as measures of effort. Participants were also asked to read 
one more article about an irrelevant topic (coral reefs), which were to serve as a covariate for 
reading speed. 
After participants completed the readings, they responded to measures of state self-
esteem. Finally, as in Study 1, participants answered questions about how carefully they read 
instructions, how much time they spent taking a break, and what type of training program the 
instructions stated that the readings were intended for. They also typed the name of the close 
other they were asked to visualize at the beginning of the survey and then matched the close 
others from Survey 1 again to their contingencies of acceptance. Debriefing about the purpose of 
the study and a survey code to receive monetary reimbursement followed. Participants received 
$2.40 for completion of Survey 2. 
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 Materials. Difference in Study 2 from Study 1 is only in a part of the second part of the 
second survey. For that reason, only materials that are included in Study 2 but not in Study 1 are 
described below. 
 Readings on intelligence training. The first reading that all participants were asked to 
read was adapted from the article “You can grow your intelligence” by Blackwell, Trzesniewski, 
and Dweck (2007). This article conveyed a message that intelligence can be increased through 
practice the same way that muscles can be strengthened through exercise. 
In addition to this article, participants were able to read an optional reading (all 
participants accessed the reading but were told they could skip to the next page if they so 
wished); this reading described a method for training intelligence and was adapted from the 
article “A simple exercise to boost IQ” (Lehrer, 2011). 
Reading to assess reading speed. A reading about an unrelated topic, adapted from 
“Hawaii’s mysterious coral reefs turn out to be super weird” (Simon, 2016), was used to control 
for participants’ reading speed. 
 Perceptions of the readings.  To reinforce the cover story, participants were asked to rate 
how credible, worthwhile, and interesting they found the provided readings using single-item 
questions with 5-point response scales (1 = Not at all credible/worthwhile/interesting, 5 = Highly 
credible/worthwhile/interesting). 
Effort. Participants’ time spent reading the articles about intelligence training was 
recorded and used as an indicator of effort. 
 Intentions to exert effort. Participants’ selection of which free intelligence training 
package they would like to receive was used as a measure of intentions to exert effort. 
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Participants were given five choices: 1 = no package, 2 = package for occasional practice, 3 = 
package for frequent practice, and 4 = package for very frequent practice (most effective). 
 Manipulation checks. The manipulation checks took the same form as the checks in 
Study 1 except that instead of asking about what participants were told a test would measure, 
they were asked for what type of training the provided readings were intended (i.e., training of 
intelligence). 
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Chapter 5: Results  
 This chapter consists of sections for preliminary analyses, confirmatory analyses, and 
exploratory analyses. Preliminary analyses include descriptive information relevant to evaluation 
of intervention implementation (prime characteristics; information about participants’ 
responding), evaluation of main measures (correlation of anxiety and effort with self-esteem 
contingency on academics), and examination of assumptions for subsequent inferential analyses. 
Confirmatory analyses examine effect of acceptance contingency on anxiety (Study 1) and effort 
(Study 2). The prediction for the confirmatory analyses was that participants for whom 
competence acceptance contingency was activated would report more anxiety and more effort 
than participants with other activated acceptance contingencies, and that this relationship would 
be moderated by closeness to Competence Acceptor (those closer to Competence Acceptor 
would experience more anxiety and exert greater effort). Exploratory analyses in both studies 
additionally examine presence of differences among acceptance contingency conditions on 
measures of state self-esteem (because it was predicted that under activation of competence 
acceptance contingency state self-esteem might be decreased by self-doubts induced by 
anticipation of an intelligence test and increased by indication of willingness to improve one’s 
intelligence to a greater extent than under activation of other acceptance contingencies). Because 
confirmatory analysis in Study 1 suggested presence of moderating factors, exploratory analyses 
were also conducted to examine influence of additional potential moderating factors (those that 
might theoretically strengthen the influence of prime for competence acceptance contingency or 
general sensitivity to social influences). 
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Study 1: Preliminary Analyses 
The study included a number of checks to evaluate implementation fidelity. While only a 
subset of the checks (i.e., self-reported ability to recognize the visualized person; recall of being 
asked to take a test of one’s intelligence) deemed the most important was used for exclusion of 
participants from the analyses in order not to excessively limit sample size, descriptive 
information about the checks is provided for evaluation purposes. There were 28 participants 
(12.6% of all survey 2 participants) who did not pass the check of recognition of the visualized 
person or of recall of the purpose of the anticipated test; these participants were excluded from 
all analyses (leaving a sample of 194 participants available for analyses). 
Perceived characteristics of the identified close others. In order for the primes of close 
others to activate intended acceptance contingencies, it is assumed that the close others should fit 
the intended profile of acceptance contingencies. That is, at minimum, Competence Acceptor 
should be perceived as more evaluative of competence than Intrinsic and Appearance Acceptor, 
Appearance Acceptor should be perceived as more evaluative of appearance than Competence 
and Intrinsic Acceptors, and Intrinsic Acceptor should be less evaluative of competence and 
appearance as well as be perceived as more accepting of one simply for who one is than 
Competence and Appearance Acceptors. That said, it is plausible that other conditions may be 
necessary (such as a minimum level of the target contingency, or sufficient distinctiveness of the 
target contingency in relation to other contingencies for the close other). Information about 
acceptance contingencies may be inferred from the perceived close others’ evaluativeness of the 
target characteristics. Table 1 displays the means for these items per the identified close other. 
The mean values for these characteristics suggest that the minimum requirements were met. 
Appearance Acceptors also tended to care more about competence than Competence Acceptors 
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tended to care about appearance. This suggests that Appearance Acceptors might have, on the 
whole, been perceived as more contingently accepting. While appearance is only one potential 
task-irrelevant domain, somewhat greater disagreement with the statement that Appearance 
Acceptor simply accepts one for who one is suggests that this prime was indeed more contingent. 
Hence, comparison of the level of anxiety elicited by appearance vs. competence prime should 
enable comparison of the effects of greater task-irrelevant contingency with greater level of 
contingency in general. However, because of the presence of competence contingency in 
appearance prime, it is not possible to tell whether any potential greater anxiety following 
appearance prime compared to intrinsic prime is due to greater level of contingency or greater 
presence of task-relevant contingency (i.e., competence). 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics for the extent to which the identified close others accept one based on 
intrinsic qualities, appearance, and competence in Study 1 
 Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes 
Acceptance 
Contingency 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor 
 Appearance 
Acceptor 
 Competence 
Acceptor 
M SD  M SD  M SD 
Intrinsic Acceptance 6.7 0.67  3.5 1.57  4.3 1.58 
Appearance Acceptance 2.2 1.27  6.1 0.82  2.9 1.62 
Competence Acceptance 3.0 1.68  4.0 1.71  6.2 0.92 
 
 
Participants’ justifications for selection of close others for acceptance contingency 
descriptions may provide additional information about what may be primed in different 
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experimental conditions. Reasons based on which participants made acceptance contingency 
inferences were varied. For example, for appearance and competence contingencies, the reasons 
included the close other’s high performance in the domain (e.g., “She is smoking hot” for 
appearance), fit of the relational role with the participant’s acceptance schema for the role (e.g., 
“He is my boss” for competence), the close other’s comments, praise, or criticism about the 
participant’s performance in the domain (e.g., “She compliments me when I have on a really nice 
outfit but otherwise says nothing.”), the close other’s evaluation of others or differential 
acceptance based on performance in the domain or general evaluative style (e.g., “she bases her 
opinion on people by the degrees that they have” for competence), or perceptions of whether 
one’s performance in the domain determines acceptance (e.g., “This is my boss, my performance 
and competence determines his like or dislike for me” for competence). Reasons for intrinsic 
contingency included, for example, kindness, lack of being judgmental, supportiveness, or 
unconditional love (e.g., “She is my spouse and no matter what happens she will always support 
me”). The provided reasons overall indicated that participants understood descriptions of the 
acceptance contingencies and made their selections in accordance with the criteria. 
Even if the close others fit the target profile of acceptance contingency, the prime might 
not be effective unless participants desire closeness to the close other (as seen in studies 
conducted by Horberg & Chen, 2010) or the prime is sufficiently strong as to lead to automatic 
activation of acceptance contingency (the strength of the prime may be indexed by reported 
frequency of thinking about the close other). The information about potential effectiveness of the 
primes is displayed in Table 2. Greater desired closeness and frequency of thinking about the 
close other corresponded to lower overall contingency of the prime. 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive statistics for desired closeness to the identified close others and for frequency of 
thinking about them in Study 1 
 Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes 
Characteristic 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor  
Appearance 
Acceptor  
Competence 
Acceptor 
M SD  M SD  M SD 
Desired closeness 4.3 0.81  2.8 1.29  3.2 1.04 
Frequency of thinking 
about the close other 5.1 1.18  3.8 1.74  3.9 1.54 
 
 
Of course, any effects due to activation of the identified close others may have been due 
to characteristics of close others that correlate with the acceptance contingency and may exert 
unexpected effects on the dependent measures. Three such additional characteristics were 
included in this study: type of relationship to the close other, the close other’s evaluation of one’s 
competence, and the close other’s evaluation of one’s appearance. The information about these 
additional characteristics is displayed in Table 3 and Table 4. 
This information indicates a potential confound—Intrinsic Acceptor evaluates 
participants more highly than Appearance and Competence Acceptors do. Activating 
representations of close others has been shown to influence one’s success expectancies in line 
with how positive the activated close others are perceived to evaluate the individual (Shah, 
2003). If improved self-evaluation resulted in decreased anxiety, participants might experience 
less anxiety following prime of Intrinsic Acceptor compared to primes of Appearance and 
Competence Acceptors. 
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Appearance Acceptors were most likely to be friends, romantic partners, and family 
members; Competence Acceptors were most likely to be friends, those with whom one has a 
professional relationship, and family members; Intrinsic Acceptors were most likely to be 
friends, family members, and romantic partners. Greater percentage of professional relationships 
in the competence prime might be problematic as it might prime greater stress that participants 
might experience at work, which may influence participants’ level of anxiety. 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Descriptive statistics for how the identified close others are perceived to evaluate participants’ 
competence and appearance in Study 1 
 Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes 
Characteristic 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor  
Appearance 
Acceptor  Competence Acceptor 
M SD  M SD  M SD 
Evaluates participant as 
competent 6.2 0.78  5.4 1.27  5.7 1.14 
Evaluates participant as 
good-looking 5.5 1.17  4.7 1.66  4.5 1.14 
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Table 4 
 
Identified close others’ relationship to the participants in Study 1 
 
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance 
Contingency Primes 
Relationship 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor  
Appearance 
Acceptor  
Competence 
Acceptor 
Percent  Percent  Percent 
Acquaintance (not related to 
school or career) 0.0  14.9  1.5 
Friend (not related to school 
or career) 43.8  32.0  32.0 
Romantic partner 25.8  20.6  3.6 
Family member (not a 
romantic partner) 26.3  17.5  26.8 
Professional relationship (for 
example, a colleague or a 
supervisor) 1.5  6.7  28.9 
School-related relationship 
(for example, a classmate or 
a teacher) 1.0  0.5  5.7 
Other 1.5  7.7  1.5 
 
 
Manipulation and attention checks. The attention check was passed by 95.5% of 
Survey 2 participants. No breaks taken during the study were reported by 93.2% of participants. 
Reading instructions very or extremely carefully was reported by 97.8% of participants. The type 
of test (i.e., intelligence test) included in instructions was correctly recalled by 92.3% of 
participants (note that several participants reported confusion about this question as they thought 
it related to the visualization exercises). Participants confirmed that they recognized the close 
other they were instructed to visualize in 94.6% of cases. Participants identically reclassified 
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92.8% of close others with competence contingency, 92.8% of close others with appearance 
contingency, and 95.5% of close others with intrinsic contingency (these numbers should not be 
understood as evidence that participants’ perception of these close others in relation to each other 
did not change as it is possible that the participants mistakenly believed that they have to choose 
the same description as they did in a previous survey). Participants recalled at the end of the 
survey the name of the close other they were asked to visualize in 99.0% percent of cases (two 
participants wrote a description of the person rather than a name, so it was not possible to 
ascertain their answers). The relatively high rate of correct answers to each of the checks 
suggests that participants indeed paid attention to instructions, possessed consistent 
representation of the visualized close others, and were cognizant that they are about to take an 
intelligence test while answering questions about anxiety and self-esteem. 
Hypothesis guessing. Only five individuals expressed opinion that the study examined 
connection between visualization of a person and feelings (this does not include individuals who 
expressed connection between visualization task in general or visualization ability and feelings).  
Attrition. Ten individuals began the survey but did not complete it. Only one of these 
individuals left the study at a point that could be relevant to the effect of experimental conditions 
(i.e., once or after the name of the randomly assigned close other was displayed); this participant 
was in competence contingency condition. 
Correlation between baseline self-esteem contingency on academics and anxiety. 
There was a moderate positive correlation between average anxiety and average self-worth 
contingency on academics, r(192) = .251, p < .001. The covariance suggests that the measure of 
anxiety may be sensitive to activation of competence acceptance contingency. This supports the 
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use of the measure in the study as it signifies that the measure may be capable of detecting 
effects of situationally activated acceptance contingencies. 
 Distribution of relevant variables. Distributions of the variables used to examine effects 
of activated acceptance contingencies on anxiety were examined for normality (see Table 5). 
Self-esteem contingency on academics, self-evaluation of competence, and closeness to 
Competence Acceptor distributions had a largely negative skew. Threat to relational value from 
Competence Acceptor had a largely positive skew (participants tended to perceive that the close 
other would value them much less if they became less competent). 
 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics for variables used as covariates in the confirmatory analysis and additional 
variables that were used as moderators in exploratory analyses examining effects on anxiety 
Variable M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Self-esteem contingency of academics 5.3 1.03 -0.922 0.597 
Self-evaluation of competence 6.1 0.79 -1.446 3.470 
Closeness to Competence Acceptor 3.2 1.04 -0.294 -0.452 
Frequency of thinking about 
Competence Acceptor 
3.9 1.53 -0.111 -1.048 
Need to belong 3.9 1.66 -0.008 -0.930 
Threat to relational value from 
Competence Acceptor (Competence 
Acceptor’s downward acceptance 
contingencies on competence) 
2.46 1.179 0.547 0.098 
Sum of risk factors 3.3 1.49 -0.058 -0.646 
 
Note. SE for skewness = 0.175; SE for kurtosis = 0.347. 
 
 
 In order to ascertain whether the data is suitable for analyses of variance, the distributions 
of anxiety were examined for normality (by acceptance contingency condition and by desired 
closeness, see Table 6; and by acceptance contingency and by susceptibility to acceptance 
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contingencies, see Table 7). The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality indicated considerable 
departures from normality in almost all groups. Homogeneity of variance was also examined. 
For grouping of acceptance contingency condition by desired closeness, Levene’s test did not 
indicate violation of homogeneity of variance, p = .120; for grouping of acceptance contingency 
condition by susceptibility to acceptance contingencies, Levene’s test also did not indicate 
violation of homogeneity of variance, p = .076. 
 
 
Table 6 
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of anxiety for acceptance contingency 
condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor 
Cell 
Shapiro-Wilk test 
Statistic p-value 
Above-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency .920 .014 
Above-average closeness, Appearance contingency .917 .020 
Above-average closeness, Competence contingency .915 .014 
Below-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency .931 .047 
Below-average closeness, Appearance contingency .900 .004 
Below-average closeness, Competence contingency .905 .013 
 
 
Table 7 
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of anxiety for acceptance contingency 
condition by susceptibility to acceptance contingencies 
Cell 
Shapiro-Wilk test 
Statistic p-value 
High susceptibility, Intrinsic contingency .925 .025 
High susceptibility, Appearance contingency .931 .093 
High susceptibility, Competence contingency .938 .079 
Low susceptibility, Intrinsic contingency .924 .030 
Low susceptibility, Appearance contingency .891 .001 
Low susceptibility, Competence contingency .895 .006 
 Visual inspection of the histograms (Figure 2 and 3) indicated several shapes of 
distributions for different cells of analyses. Participants below-average in desired closeness to 
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Competence Acceptor and those with a small number of identified risks to susceptibility to 
acceptance contingencies (i.e., three or fewer) tended to exhibit bimodal distribution of anxiety 
in all experimental conditions. In contrast, those with above-average desired closeness or high 
susceptibility to acceptance contingencies tended to exhibit flat or slightly positively skewed 
distribution of anxiety when in either intrinsic or appearance acceptance contingency conditions, 
and negatively skewed distribution in competence acceptance contingency condition. 
The negatively skewed distribution in competence acceptance contingency condition 
might be construed as a result of the effects of the experimental condition (individuals who 
would have otherwise reported little anxiety reported more anxiety because of the visualization 
of Competence Acceptor), and thus be an evidence supporting the hypothesis of the study. 
Different shapes of the distributions do not enable uniform transformation, and thus 
complicate analyses. For the confirmatory analysis that used self-esteem contingency on 
academics and gender as covariates, another violation of the assumptions might be heterogeneity 
of variances (while self-esteem contingency on academics and gender did not statistically 
significantly interact with anxiety, exploratory analyses indicated that women and those above-
average on self-esteem contingency on academics might be more sensitive to the effects of 
competence acceptance contingency). Despite violations of normality and differences in shapes 
of distributions, analyses of variance were conducted anyway (due to the author’s lack of 
knowledge of techniques that would be more appropriate). However, because of the multiple 
violations of assumptions, caution has to be exercised in interpreting the reported results of the 
statistical significance tests and effect sizes. 
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Figure 2. Histogram for distribution of anxiety by acceptance contingency condition and by 
closeness to Competence Acceptor 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Histogram for distribution of anxiety by acceptance contingency condition and by 
susceptibility to acceptance contingencies 
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Study 1: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety (Confirmatory Analysis). 
A 3 (contingency: intrinsic vs. appearance vs. competence) x 2 (desired closeness to 
Competence Acceptor: dichotomized at below-average vs. above-average) analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted to examine whether activating domain-specific acceptance 
contingencies influenced participants’ anxiety and whether this relationship was moderated by 
desired closeness to Competence Acceptor; self-esteem contingency on academics, self-
evaluation of competence, and gender were used as covariates. The effects of condition were 
predicted to be moderated by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor because greater desired 
closeness might enhance the effectiveness of the prime (loss of relational value in the eyes of 
close other with whom one highly desires closeness might be more threatening). Higher baseline 
self-esteem contingency on academics (an indicator of how much others in one’s life in general 
may evaluate one based on intellectual performance), lower self-evaluation of competence 
(lower perceived competence may lead to greater worries about performing poorly), and being a 
female were characteristics that were predicted to be associated with higher anxiety, and thus 
were chosen as covariates to reduce the error term. 
All three covariates were statistically significant predictors of anxiety in the predicted 
direction: contingency of self-worth on academics, F(1, 184) = 11.729, MSe = 539.869, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .060; self-evaluation of one’s competence, F(1, 184) = 4.034, p = .046, ηp2 = .021; and 
gender, F(1, 184) = 7.720, p = .006, ηp2 = .040. The interaction between desired closeness and 
contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 184) = .943, p = .391, ηp2 = .010. The 
main effect of contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 184) = 1.361, p = 
.259, ηp2 = .015. The main effect of closeness was not statistically significant either, F(1, 184) = 
0.701, p = .404, ηp2 = .004. 
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Nevertheless, the direction of the means was as predicted, with larger differences 
between competence contingency and other conditions observed among those who desired 
closeness to the close other with perceived competence-contingent acceptance (see Figure 4). 
Moreover, the effect sizes for the differences between competence contingency and other 
conditions among those above-average in desired closeness were sizeable considering the brief 
procedure used to activate the acceptance contingencies: d = 0.54 for difference between 
competence and intrinsic contingency, d = 0.46 for difference between competence and 
appearance contingency (see Table 8). These results provide initial support for the hypotheses of 
this study and substantiate a need for replication of the study with larger, more targeted sample. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and desired closeness to 
Competence Acceptor 
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Table 8 
 
Descriptive statistics of average anxiety displayed by dichotomized desired closeness to the close 
other with competence-contingent acceptance, and by experimental group 
Factor n M SD 
Cohen’s ds for differences between 
group means 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Desired closeness below-average          
1. Intrinsic contingency 31 3.32 1.60       
2. Appearance contingency 35 3.56 1.74 0.14      
3. Competence contingency 28 3.48 1.97 0.09 0.04     
 
Desired closeness above-average 
         
4. Intrinsic contingency 35 3.50 1.95 0.10 0.03 0.01    
5. Appearance contingency 31 3.63 2.02 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.07   
6. Competence contingency 33 4.44 1.48 0.72 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.46  
Note. Unadjusted means are displayed. 
 
 
Study 1: Exploratory Analyses 
Examining moderation by theorized individual difference variables of effects of 
contingency conditions on anxiety. Given quite large error variance in the whole sample, 
means for the experimental conditions were obtained for subgroups of participants based on 
individual difference variables hypothesized to influence the strength of the effects (see Table 9 
for correlations of membership in these groups). The purpose of these analyses was to identify 
whether the activated acceptance contingencies might be differentially effective for different 
groups of participants. Evidence that they are may inform selection of participants for the future 
replication study. 
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Table 9 
 
Correlations among the dichotomized variables used to investigate differential effectiveness of 
the experimental conditions 
 
Subgroup classification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Above-average desired closeness to Competence 
Accepter 
--      
2. Above-average frequency of thinking about 
Competence Accepter 
.42 --     
3. Above-average need to belong .30 .15 --    
4. High threat to relational value -.04 -.05 -.01 --   
5. Above-average self-worth contingencies on academics .22 .12 .08 .09 --  
6. Female .01 .08 .09 -.01 .01 -- 
 
 
Frequency of thinking about the close other whose acceptance depends on competence. 
The influence of competence contingency prime should theoretically also be strengthened by 
higher frequency of thinking about the close other identified for the competence contingency 
acceptance profile. Thinking about close others more frequently should lead to greater 
consideration of what their acceptance depends on, and thus greater likelihood of automatic 
activation of their acceptance contingencies when being reminded of them. A plot of means by 
frequency of thinking about the close other identified for competence contingency (above-
average vs. below-average) is displayed in Figure 5. There was a trend for larger differences in 
anxiety between competence contingency condition and appearance contingency condition as 
well as between competence contingency condition and intrinsic contingency condition among 
those in the subgroup who reported thinking about the close other more frequently compared to 
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the other subgroup; the relative magnitude of the means was also in the predicted direction. This 
resulted reflected the trend evidenced in grouping by closeness to the close other. The result of 
the analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety when the sample for analysis was 
restricted to those above-average in frequency of thinking about Competence Acceptor was as 
follows: F(2, 113) = 1.748, MSe = 3.366, p = .179, ηp2 = .030. Among those above-average in 
frequency of thinking about Competence Acceptor, the effect sizes were d = 0.43 for difference 
between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.31 for difference between competence 
and appearance contingency. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and frequency of 
thinking about Competence Acceptor 
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 Need to belong. Desired closeness to the close other who cares about one’s competence 
and frequency of thinking about him or her enable only comparison of the influences of stronger 
prime of competence contingency to less strong prime of competence contingency relative to the 
primes of appearance and intrinsic contingency that are of whichever strength that happens to 
correlate with the desire to be close to someone who cares about one’s competence or thinking 
about him or her more frequently. For that reason, the moderation of the influence of conditions 
on anxiety was also examined for individuals who were above-average vs. below-average on a 
single-item measure of need to belong. Since the need to belong should index one’s 
susceptibility to being accepted, susceptibility to the influence of all activated acceptance 
contingencies should be higher in individuals who are higher in the need to belong. As seen in 
Figure 6, the trend for larger difference between competency contingency and intrinsic 
contingency again emerged. In contrast to the groupings that included a group that strengthened 
only competence contingency prime, the differences in means between the competence 
contingency condition and appearance contingency condition were quite similar. As close others 
identified for appearance contingency profile tended to also be perceived as somewhat evaluative 
of one’s competence, it is plausible that participants sensitive to social cues reacted to the 
presence of the competence contingency in appearance-contingent close others. The result of the 
analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety when the sample for the analysis was 
restricted to those above-average on need to belong was as follows: F(2, 102) = 1.743, MSe = 
3.338, p = .180, ηp2 = .033. Among those above-average in need to belong, the effect sizes were 
d = 0.44 for difference between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.15 for 
difference between competence and appearance contingency. 
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Figure 6. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and need to belong 
 
 
 
Threat to relational value. Both desired closeness to the competence person, frequency 
of thinking about the competence person, and general susceptibility to social influences should 
exacerbate participants’ responsiveness to the activated acceptance contingencies. But in order 
for the acceptance contingencies to be influential when one is sensitive to them, participants 
should perceive that their value in the close others’ eyes indeed substantially hinges on 
performance in the domain of acceptance contingency. For that reason, the influence of activated 
contingency was additionally examined for participants for whom failure at the task evaluative of 
their competence would result in the highest loss in terms of relational value vs. those for whom 
it would have relatively little consequence. The participants with high risk of loss of relational 
value were operationalized as those who indicated that the person identified for competence 
contingency profile would value them “less” or “much less” if they became much less 
competent; those with low risk of loss of relational value as those who indicated “slightly less”, 
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“still the same”, or more for the same question. As seen in Figure 7, those at a greater risk for 
loss of relational value from the competence person reported higher anxiety when in competence 
contingency condition than in either of the appearance or intrinsic contingency conditions; this 
trend did not emerge for participants who faced little threat to their relational value from 
competence person. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction. When the sample for 
analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety was restricted to participants at high 
risk of loss of relational value, an effect of experimental condition emerged at a conventionally 
statistically significant level, F(2, 103) = 3.416, MSe = 3.125, p = .037, ηp2 = .062. Among those 
with high threat to relational value from Competence Acceptor, the effect sizes were d = 0.57 for 
difference between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.54 for difference between 
competence and appearance contingency. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and threat to relational 
value from Competence Acceptor 
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Baseline self-worth contingency on academics. Individuals with higher baseline 
contingency of self-worth on academics might be more sensitive to the activation of competence 
contingency acceptance. This possibility is consistent with the observed relationships (see Figure 
8). This may indicate that those most likely to be at risk for experiencing side effects of 
competence contingency may be the ones who are the most sensitive to situational changes in 
acceptance contingencies (rather than that the observed relationships are driven by individuals 
who are at a relatively low risk but become considerably more anxious once the competence 
contingency is activated). The result of the analysis of the effect of experimental condition on 
anxiety when the sample for the analysis was restricted to those above-average on self-worth 
contingency on academics was as follows: F(2, 108) = 3.017, MSe = 3.152, p = .053, ηp2 = .053. 
Among those with above-average contingency of self-worth on academics, the effect sizes were 
d = 0.59 for difference between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.40 for 
difference between competence and appearance contingency. 
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Figure 8. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and contingency of self-
worth on academics 
 
 
Gender. Because women in this study reported more anxiety (M = 4.00, SD = 1.80) than 
men (M = 3.25, SD = 1.76) and because prior research showed gender differences in responses to 
anxiety-reducing interventions that were based on reminders of social support (e.g., Shnabel, 
Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, Garcia, & Cohen, 2013), differences in means across experimental 
groups were also examined with the means grouped by gender. Similar pattern of results 
emerged as when the results were grouped by the other individual-differences variables assumed 
to enhance sensitivity to social influences (or strengthen the influence of competence prime). As 
seen in Figure 9, there was a trend for women in competence contingency condition to report 
higher anxiety compared to women in non-task related contingencies; this trend was not 
evidenced in men. The result of the analysis of the effect of experimental condition on anxiety 
70 
 
when the sample for the analysis was restricted to women was as follows: F(2, 109) = 3.017, 
MSe = 3.143, p = .053, ηp2 = .052. Among women, the effect sizes were d = 0.54 for difference 
between competence and intrinsic contingency, and d = 0.44 for difference between competence 
and appearance contingency. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and gender 
  
 
Summed risk factors. Because of participant overlap among the six risk factors for 
susceptibility to acceptance contingencies (45.4% of participants had four or more risk factors), 
the results are also presented for one-way ANOVA conducted only with participants who had a 
high number of risk factors (i.e., four or more). The assumption of homogeneity of variances was 
not formally violated for this analysis, as assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances 
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(p = .066). However, Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated that scores on anxiety were not normally 
distributed in intrinsic acceptance contingency condition (p = .025); there were no formal 
violations of normality for appearance acceptance contingency condition (p = .093) and 
competence acceptance contingency condition (p = .079). With the analysis restricted to those 
who had four or more risk factors, one-way ANOVA revealed a statistically significant main 
effect of acceptance contingency condition, F(2, 85) = 4.234, MSe = 3.119, p = .018, ηp2 = .091. 
Tukey HSD indicated that the mean level of anxiety in competence acceptance contingency was 
significantly higher than the mean level of anxiety in intrinsic acceptance contingency, p < .05; 
the other comparisons were not statistically significant. Among those with four or more 
identified risk factors for susceptibility to acceptance contingencies, the effect sizes were d = 
0.77 for difference between competence and intrinsic contingency condition, and d = 0.53 for 
difference between competence and appearance contingency condition. Among those at low risk 
of susceptibility to acceptance contingencies (i.e., those with three or fewer risk factors), the 
effect sizes were negligible: d = 0.07 for difference between competence and intrinsic 
contingency condition, and d = .10 for difference between competence and appearance 
contingency condition. See Figure 10 for the means per group. These results suggest that the 
hypothesized effects of acceptance contingencies on anxiety may apply only to individuals for 
whom failure may result in perceptibly high loss of relational value. 
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Figure 10. Means for anxiety as a function of the experimental condition and susceptibility to 
acceptance contingencies 
 
 
Differences in state self-esteem among contingency conditions. If activations of 
representations of close others indeed shift participants’ self-esteem contingencies (Horberg & 
Chen, 2010) and if possibility of taking an intelligence test makes one doubt one’s intellectual 
abilities and if there are not substantial differences in the way that close others accept 
participants or the way they evaluate them, it could be expected that those in the competence 
contingency condition experience lower state self-esteem than those in the other conditions. 
To examine this possibility, ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of the 
experimental condition on self-esteem emotions, and on state self-esteem. The effect of condition 
on self-esteem emotions was statistically non-significant, F(2, 191) = 1.014, MSe = .981, p = 
.365, ηp2 = .011. For state self-esteem, the effect of condition was statistically significant, F(2, 
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191) = 3.586, MSe = 2.218, p = .030, ηp2 = .036. However, the direction of the results was not as 
predicted. A Tukey HSD follow-up procedure revealed that the mean for participants in 
appearance acceptance contingency condition (M = 5.27) was statistically significantly larger 
than the mean for participants in the intrinsic acceptance contingency condition (M = 4.58), p < 
.05. This effect might have been obtained if the measure was sensitive to the way that the close 
others evaluate participants. Intrinsic Acceptor was perceived to evaluate participants the most 
positively on both competence and physical appearance; and Appearance Acceptor’s evaluation 
of participants’ appearance was more negative than Competence Acceptor’s evaluation of 
participants’ competence. Provided people respond defensively on measure of self-esteem to 
being more negatively evaluated in the domain of activated acceptance contingency, the 
observed effect might be obtained. 
Study 2: Preliminary Analyses 
As Study 1, Study 2 featured a number of checks. Because passing of what was deemed 
to be the most important check to the manipulation (confirming that one recognized the name of 
the close other in the visualization) already lowered the number of participants to an amount that 
was smaller than the amount originally calculated as the necessary minimum for sufficient power 
for the study, no other checks were used for exclusions. In total, 17 participants claimed not to 
have recognized the close other they were asked to visualize, leaving 173 participants available 
for analyses. 
Perceived characteristics of the identified close others. The same considerations for an 
effective prime of target acceptance contingency apply as in Study 1. Descriptive statistics for 
the profiles of contingencies for each of the identified close others in this study are displayed in 
Table 10, for desired closeness and frequency of thinking about the identified close others are in 
74 
 
Table 11, for how the close others are perceived to evaluate participants’ competence and 
appearance in Table 12, and for the relationship type the close others occupy with respect to the 
participants in Table 13. The sample characteristics in this study overall mirrored the sample 
characteristics in Study 1. 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Descriptive statistics for the extent to which the identified close others accept one based on 
intrinsic qualities, appearance, and competence in Study 2 
 Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes 
Acceptance 
Contingency 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor 
 Appearance 
Acceptor 
 Competence 
Acceptor 
M SD  M SD  M SD 
Intrinsic Acceptance 6.8 0.49  3.5 1.65  4.0 1.56 
Appearance Acceptance 2.2 1.44  6.2 0.78  3.0 1.79 
Competence Acceptance 3.0 1.72  4.1 1.73  6.4 0.76 
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Table 11 
 
Descriptive statistics for desired closeness to the identified close others and for frequency of 
thinking about them in Study 2 
 Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes 
Characteristic 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor  
Appearance 
Acceptor  
Competence 
Acceptor 
M SD  M SD  M SD 
Desired closeness 4.3 0.75  2.8 1.28  3.3 0.93 
Frequency of thinking 
about the close other 5.2 1.07  3.5 1.67  4.1 1.47 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
 
Descriptive statistics for how the identified close others are perceived to evaluate participants’ 
competence and appearance in Study 2 
 Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency Primes 
Characteristic 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor  
Appearance 
Acceptor  
Competence 
Acceptor 
M SD  M SD  M SD 
Evaluates participant as 
competent 6.3 0.75  5.3 1.24  5.6 1.32 
Evaluates participant as 
good-looking 5.6 1.13  4.6 1.66  4.5 1.18 
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Table 13 
 
Identified close others’ relationship to the participants in Study 2 
 
Close Others Identified for the Acceptance Contingency 
Primes 
Relationship 
Intrinsic 
Acceptor  
Appearance 
Acceptor  
Competence 
Acceptor 
Percent  Percent  Percent 
Acquaintance (not related to 
school or career) 0.0  16.2  2.9 
Friend (not related to school 
or career) 38.7  33.5  19.1 
Romantic partner 29.5  17.9  3.5 
Family member (not a 
romantic partner) 26.6  18.5  27.2 
Professional relationship (for 
example, a colleague or a 
supervisor) 2.9  6.4  42.2 
School-related relationship 
(for example, a classmate or 
a teacher) 0.0  2.3  2.9 
Other 2.3  5.2  2.3 
 
 
Manipulation and attention checks. The attention check was passed by 96.3% of 
Survey 2 participants. No breaks taken during the study were reported by 83.2% of participants. 
Reading instructions very or extremely carefully was reported by 98.9% of participants. The type 
of training program (i.e., intelligence training program) included in the instructions was correctly 
recognized by 96.3% of participants. Participants confirmed that they recognized the close other 
they were instructed to visualize in 91.1% of cases. Participants identically reclassified 94.2% of 
close others with competence contingency, 96.3% of close others with appearance contingency, 
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and 95.3% of close others with intrinsic contingency. Participants recalled at the end of the 
survey the name of the close other they were asked to visualize in 97.9% percent of cases (3 of 
the participants who did not recall the name typed the name of the animal they visualized). 
Again, as in Study 1, the overall rate of passing these various checks was sufficiently high so as 
not to cast doubt about participants’ lack of conscientiousness in responding to the survey. 
Hypothesis guessing. Participants appear to have been unaware of the hypotheses of the 
study. Only one person wrote that the study might be investigating the connection between the 
visualized person and answers on subsequent questions. 
Attrition. Seven individuals began the survey but did not complete it. Six of these 
individuals reached at least the page with the visualization exercise of their close other (three 
were in competence acceptance contingency condition, one in intrinsic acceptance contingency 
condition, and one in appearance acceptance contingency condition).  
Correlation between baseline self-esteem contingency on academics and effort 
measures. There were no associations between self-esteem contingency on academics and any 
of the effort measures: rs (171) = -.005, p = .952, for association with reading time 1; rs (171) = -
.042, p = .581, for association with reading time 2; and rs (171) = .095, p = .212, for association 
with choice of the intelligence training package. Failure to find any association between self-
esteem contingency on academics (which is assumed to index chronic level of acceptance 
contingency) and the effort measures suggests that the measures for effort are inadequate 
representations of the construct, effort is not related to acceptance contingencies under contexts 
similar to the study, there are unexamined moderators of this relationship, or perhaps that the 
measures are subject to the influence of too many other variables, making it difficult to detect the 
relationship. Because chronic levels of acceptance contingencies are assumed to be stronger 
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predictors of effects associated with acceptance contingencies than any differences between 
experimental conditions that might have been induced by relational priming, the observed lack of 
the associations suggests that the effect of the activated acceptance contingencies on the 
measures of effort was unlikely to be obtained in this study. 
Distribution of relevant variables. Distributions of the three main dependent variables 
were examined for normality. 
The distribution of choice of an intelligence training package was mostly bimodal, with 
participants either choosing not to receive the package or to receive its most intensive form: 
35.3% of participants chose to receive no package, 12.1% of participants chose to receive a 
package for occasional practice, 10.4% of participants chose to receive a package for frequent 
practice, 42.2% of participants chose to receive package for very frequent practice. 
In order to ascertain whether the data is suitable for ANCOVA, the distributions of 
reading times on articles 1 and 2 were examined for normality and equality of variances. There 
was homogeneity of variances for reading time of article 1, as assessed by Levene’s test of 
equality of variances, p = .303; on reading time of article 2, the assumption of homogeneity of 
variances was violated, p = .027. As can be seen in Tables 14 and 15 as well as Figures 11 and 
12, the data did not follow a normal distribution. There was a large positive skew in both reading 
times, with reading time on article 2 additionally showing inflation around zero (representative 
of participants’ decision not to read the optional article). Multiple outliers were also apparent. 
The obtained data make the selected analytical method inappropriate; however, it was 
used anyway due to the author’s inexperience with other statistical methods. Based on the visual 
inspection of the distributions, it is not anticipated that there would be any differences among the 
groups even if more appropriate analytical methods were employed. 
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For means and standard deviations of variables used for confirmatory analyses of effects 
on reading times, see Table 16. 
 
 
Table 14 
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of reading time on article 1 for acceptance 
contingency condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor 
Cell 
Shapiro-Wilk test 
Statistic p-value 
Above-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency .926 .145 
Above-average closeness, Appearance contingency .782 <.001 
Above-average closeness, Competence contingency .975 .700 
Below-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency .846 <.001 
Below-average closeness, Appearance contingency .585 <.001 
Below-average closeness, Competence contingency .469 <.001 
 
 
Table 15 
The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of distribution of reading time on article 2 for acceptance 
contingency condition by desired closeness to Competence Acceptor 
Cell 
Shapiro-Wilk test 
Statistic p-value 
Above-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency .847 .006 
Above-average closeness, Appearance contingency .786 <.001 
Above-average closeness, Competence contingency .811 <.001 
Below-average closeness, Intrinsic contingency .848 <.001 
Below-average closeness, Appearance contingency .846 .001 
Below-average closeness, Competence contingency .636 <.001 
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Figure 11. Histograms for distribution of reading time 1 by acceptance contingency condition 
and by closeness to Competence Acceptor 
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Figure 12. Histogram for distribution of reading time 2 by acceptance contingency condition and 
by closeness to Competence Acceptor 
 
 
Table 16 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the confirmatory analysis in Study 2 
Variable M SD 
Reading time on article 1 173.9 149.56 
Reading time on article 2 (optional) 95.4 111.52 
Reading time on article 3 191.4 219.40 
Desired closeness to Competence Acceptor 3.34 0.93 
Note. The reading times are expressed in seconds. 
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Study 2: Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort (Confirmatory Analyses) 
 Effects on selection of intelligence training package. A chi-square test of independence 
was conducted between experimental condition and choice of a type of intelligence training 
package (classified into three categories: no package, package for occasional or frequent 
practice, package for very frequent practice). There was no statistically significant association 
between the experimental condition and the choice of the intelligence training package, χ2 (4) = 
1.51, p = .825. 
Effect on reading time of article 1. A 3 (contingency: intrinsic vs. appearance vs. 
competence) x 2 (desired closeness to Competence Acceptor: dichotomized at below-average vs. 
above-average) ANCOVA was conducted to examine whether activating domain-specific 
acceptance contingencies influenced participants’ effort as operationalized by reading time of 
article 1, and whether this relationship was moderated by desired closeness to Competence. 
Reading speed (reading time of article 3) was used as a covariate. 
No statistically significant effects were detected. The interaction between desired 
closeness and contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 166) = 0.376, MSe = 
7257.131, p = .687, ηp2 = .005. The main effect of contingency condition was not statistically 
significant, F(2, 166) = 0.125, p = .883, ηp2 = .001. The main effect of closeness was not 
statistically significant either, F(1, 166) = 2.717, p = .101, ηp2 = .016. 
Effect on reading time of article 2. The same analysis as for effect of acceptance 
contingencies on reading time of article 1 was conducted for effect on reading time of article 2.  
 No statistically significant effects were detected. The interaction between desired 
closeness and contingency condition was not statistically significant, F(2, 166) = 2.169, MSe = 
23560.265, p = .118, ηp2 = .025. The main effect of contingency condition was not statistically 
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significant, F(2, 166) = 1.018, p = .364, ηp2 = .012. The main effect of closeness was not 
statistically significant, F(1, 166) = 0.641, p = .424, ηp2 = .004. 
Study 2: Exploratory Analyses 
Differences in state self-esteem among contingency conditions. Reading about articles 
that include information about the possibility to improve one’s intelligence might improve one’s 
state self-esteem provided one’s acceptance is contingent on it (as it may mitigate doubts about 
potential future changes in relational value due to one’s lack of intelligence). If this was the case, 
it could be plausible that activation of competence acceptance contingency would increase state 
self-esteem compared to activation of other acceptance contingencies. 
For that reason, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of the 
experimental condition on self-esteem emotions, and on state self-esteem. Neither the effects on 
self-esteem emotions, F(2, 170) = .975, MSe = .733, p = .379, ηp2 = .011, nor the effects on state 
self-esteem, F(2, 170) = 1.668, MSe = 1.854, p = .192, ηp2 = .019, were statistically significant. 
Possible reasons for the failure to find any differences might have been, for example, due 
to a lack of participants’ perceived relevance of the activated acceptance contingency to the 
domain of the task, or due to reading of an article about possibility to improve one’s intelligence 
not being a sufficiently strong stimulus as to improve one’s self-assessment of competence in the 
absence of direct success feedback (similarly as perhaps a potential for failure at a task in Study 
1 might not have been enough to worsen one’s self-assessment in the absence of any direct 
failure feedback). 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
Overview 
The present studies were the first to examine the domain-specific impact of situational 
activation of contingencies of acceptance on anxiety (Study 1) and effort (Study 2). In Study 1, 
sample participants who were reminded of a close other whose acceptance was perceived to be 
mainly contingent on competence reported greater anxiety about evaluative performance in the 
domain of contingency (i.e., competence) compared to participants who were reminded of a 
close other whose acceptance was perceived to be mainly contingent on a domain irrelevant to 
the anticipated test (i.e., appearance) or unconditional; this relationship was not statistically 
significant at a conventional level when the analysis was carried out for the whole sample but 
was significant or approaching significance when carried out for certain theorized subgroups 
(membership in these subgroups can be seen as indexing risk for susceptibility to influence of 
acceptance contingencies; medium to large effect sizes were obtained for participants with four 
of more of the six identified risk factors). 
When analyses of the effects of experimental condition on anxiety were restricted to 
subgroups of participants theorized to have greater general sensitivity toward social influences or 
those for whom the prime of competence acceptance contingency is theorized to be particularly 
strong, the effects emerged at p-values that ranged from .037 to .180. The Cohen’s ds for the 
differences between the means were around 0.5. The effect size of this magnitude may be 
considered substantial given the relatively brief procedure used to activate acceptance 
contingencies and absence of specific mentioning of acceptance schema during the session when 
anxiety was measured. This effect size is of practical significance because multitude of day-to-
day reminders of one’s significant others may lead to large cumulative effects. The effect of 
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experimental condition was statistically significant at a conventional level for the participants 
theorized to be the most vulnerable to the potential exposure to the prime of competence 
acceptance contingency (i.e., those who reported that the close other whose acceptance depends 
on competence would value them less or much less if they became more incompetent). Given 
that the results for the theorized subgroups emerged in consistent, predicted directions and given 
that they are conceptually corroborated by prior research, these results may with caution be 
collectively interpreted as providing initial support for the domain-specific effects of acceptance 
contingency on anxiety. However, replication of the study with larger, more targeted sample will 
be essential to obtaining stronger evidence. Overall, the findings of Study 1 shed light on factors 
that may contribute to negative emotional experiences during pursuit of competence (as well as 
perhaps other pursuits that may impact one’s relational value) and point to potential untapped 
sources of resilience that individuals may be able to learn to draw upon if they are educated 
about these mechanisms and trained to take advantage of them. 
The Study 2 showed no effects of experimental condition on measures of effort and 
intention to exert effort to improve one’s intellectual competence. Since the measures were not 
even weakly correlated with baseline level of relevant domain of self-esteem contingency 
(academics; self-esteem contingency is assumed to function as proxy for chronic level of 
acceptance contingency in the given domain), these results suggest that the measures were not a 
good representation of the target construct or that the relationship between acceptance 
contingency and effort may be weak or non-existent (or a product of more complicated processes 
than was anticipated). 
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Limitations 
 One of the important limitations of present research is tied to inevitable issues that arise 
in research that contrasts effects of activations of mental representations of other individuals 
based on the individuals’ target characteristics. Namely, the primes for the target characteristic to 
be activated may lack clarity, be contaminated with presence of characteristics that were 
intended to be activated in other experimental conditions, or be confounded in their effects with 
other correlated characteristics of the identified individuals. 
Previous studies contrasting effects of primes consisting of mental activation of close 
others (intrinsic vs. contingent) typically relied on the wording of description based on which 
participants identified the primes; measures of the extent to which the desired characteristics 
were actually obtained were not included (except for Horberg & Chen, 2010, who included only 
participants who expressed at least moderate certainty about the close other possessing a given 
acceptance contingency). For example, to ensure that the activated close others are comparable 
with respect to how they like the participant, (Arndt et al., 2002) added specification that the 
selected close other who fits given criteria of acceptance contingency profile also clearly likes 
the participant; however, no measures as to the extent to which participants were able to identify 
individuals who fit the criterion were included. 
The measures included in present studies suggest that inclusion of a certain characteristic 
in a wording of acceptance contingency profile is likely methodologically insufficient to infer its 
presence in the identified individual and that measures should be included to enable estimation of 
the extent to which suitable primes were obtained. For example, in the present study, there was a 
clear evidence of presence of competence acceptance contingency in the appearance contingency 
prime. That said, the present studies used a set of criteria that might have been more difficult to 
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meet than criteria used in prior studies (prominent acceptance contingency in a given domain 
compared to just general acceptance contingency). 
In contrast to prior research, present studies also included a larger number of measures to 
make it possible to identify and evaluate confounds that may need to be disentangled in future 
research. For example, there were systematic differences in the types of relationships that the 
identified close others had with respect to the participants. If participants experienced difficulties 
more often in a particular type of relationship, the differences might have influenced the effects 
of primes in unexpected ways because they could have primed negative affective reactions. 
Some researchers have speculated that the type of relationship may be also important based on 
the extent to which different relationships can be easily dissolved or replaced (Horberg & Chen, 
2010), with relationships that would be difficult to dissolve or replace wielding larger influence. 
Additionally, there were some differences in the way that the close others evaluated the 
participants’ competence. Because primes of close others may influence participants’ perceived 
competence at a task (Shah, 2003) and because lower perceived competence is associated with 
greater anxiety, lower evaluation of participants in the eyes of the close others may have an 
effect on participants’ anxiety. According to the participants’ perception, Intrinsic Acceptors 
tended to view participants as more competent than did Competence Acceptors, which in turn 
viewed the participants as somewhat more competent than Appearance Acceptors. However, 
given that Appearance Acceptors were perceived to evaluate participants’ competence more 
negatively but participants nevertheless tended to be more anxious in competence acceptance 
contingency condition compared to appearance acceptance condition suggests that the way in 
which the close others evaluated participants might not have been as important as the acceptance 
contingencies the close others were perceived to possess. 
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Another limitation is that no research today has demonstrated which aspects of 
acceptance contingencies are particularly likely to elicit the effects of a given acceptance 
contingency. It may be, for example, that for a given perceived acceptance contingency to exert 
its effects, it needs to be perceived as being of a certain strength. Or, perhaps, in order for a given 
acceptance contingency to exert effects, it needs to be sufficiently distinct from other acceptance 
contingencies the close other is perceived to have—it is likely that akin to a goal being more 
likely to be primed when there are no competing goals (Shah & Kruglanski, 2000), an 
acceptance contingency may be more likely to be primed when there are fewer competing 
acceptance contingencies. Because of the uncertainty about characteristics of the acceptance 
contingency profile that can potentiate a given acceptance contingency, it is impossible to 
evaluate the extent to which the obtained acceptance contingency profiles for the identified close 
others actually led to activation of acceptance contingencies.  
 The procedure used to identify close others may also present challenge to ecological 
validity of the way the effects of acceptance contingencies may be activated in real life upon 
activation of representation of close others. While the visualization task is not assumed to alter 
the effects that might result from real-world ways through which the close others might be 
activated (spontaneous thinking about the close others; encounters of the close others in real life; 
reminders of the close others through an activity associated with the close others; etc.), the 
procedure used to identify the close others in the survey and obtain information about the close 
others’ acceptance contingencies might have induced a level of self-reflection that is not 
common for participants in daily life, and thus unduly exacerbated the level of acceptance 
contingencies associated with the close others. However, the week-long separation between the 
two survey administrations is assumed to have mitigated the effects of the reflective procedure. 
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Additionally, while the procedure may complicate inferences to real-world activation 
processes, it may be more representative of effects that might be evidenced if people were 
trained to take advantage of thinking about close others with particular acceptance contingencies 
(as such training would involve teaching participants about processes associated with acceptance 
contingencies and self-reflection on the acceptance contingencies operative in their social 
environment). Because of desire to draw inferences about feasibility of interventions, the 
procedure is also superior to the procedure involving subliminal priming of close others 
(subliminal and supraliminal priming procedures of close others have been shown to have 
different impacts for a subset of participants who may be more likely to doubt their close others’ 
acceptance, i.e., anxiously attached participants; Mikulincer, Shaver, & Rom, 2011). A related 
caveat with respect to ecological validity is that is also remains unclear whether effects would be 
measurable in the context of more common daily tasks that may not have as powerful 
consequences to one’s relational value as an intelligence test might. 
 The main objective of the studies was to examine impact of intrinsic vs. contingent 
acceptance on dependent variables that were previously unexamined in the context of situational 
activation of acceptance contingencies, and to compare greater level of general task-irrelevant 
contingency with greater level of task-relevant contingency.  For that reason, it was not deemed 
necessary to include a measurement of the dependent variables in the absence of visualization of 
close others. Yet, the lack of no visualization of close other condition makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether observed effects represented a reduction or augmentation compared to no 
visualization. That said, even if no visualization of close other condition was performed, making 
such a judgment would be problematic because the relative effects might depend on the type of 
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contingencies that are chronically accessible to participants, which may differ across different 
populations and contexts even though the underlying mechanisms may be identical. 
Nevertheless, it is recommended that future research examines the effects separately 
under conditions in which baseline task-relevant acceptance contingency is assumed to be high 
vs. low (or in which there is difference in the general level of threat to one’s relational value such 
as when one suspects that one’s performance might actually be observable by others vs. not): it is 
plausible that brief activation of task-relevant acceptance contingency exacerbates threats when 
baseline task-relevant contingency is low but that when baseline task-relevant contingency is 
high, replacement of task-relevant acceptance contingency with task-irrelevant contingency is 
not a feasible mechanisms (the greater effects observed in subgroup of participants with higher 
baseline self-esteem contingency on academics suggest that this is not the case though). 
Additionally, the inferences about the domain-specificity of acceptance contingencies 
would be strengthened if effects were also examined within a context of a task in a domain that is 
different from competence. That said, there is no clear reason to assume that the specificity 
would be evidenced only for competence but not for other domains.  
 There are also questions about the extent to which the measurements in the studies reflect 
target constructs. As noted previously, self-reported anxiety may reflect greater self-
handicapping. Addition of physiological measurement of anxiety if the study is replicated in the 
future in laboratory setting would mitigate the concern. Nevertheless, because self-handicapping 
is reflective of the level of threat experienced, the inferences about the extent to which there are 
domain-specific effects of acceptance contingencies on eliciting/mitigating threat should be valid 
regardless of whether greater reported anxiety reflects greater anxiety or greater self-
handicapping. The validity of analogous inferences about processes in question in Study 2, 
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however, needs to be questioned as the measures of effort did not correlate with baseline self-
esteem contingency on academics. As an alternative explanation to the measure being a poor 
representation of the construct, the lack of correlation in the study might have been caused by a 
lack of instructions that would connect relevance of wider contingency of acceptance on 
competence to improvement of intelligence. In Study 1, the description of the test of intelligence 
explicitly connected importance of intelligence to outcomes connected to competence (such as 
performance at school or at work); such a description was omitted in Study 2. This omission 
might have caused the lack of correlation with the self-esteem contingency as well as observed 
lack of effects of priming of acceptance contingencies. 
 Limitations of the present research also involve use of parametric inferential statistics for 
data that violates multiple assumptions of the analyses that were carried out. Effect sizes and 
judgments about statistical significance might have been affected because of the chosen 
analytical methods. 
Lack of Observed Effects of Acceptance Contingencies on Effort 
As explained above, the lack of observed differences among experimental conditions 
might have been due to an insufficient connection between the domain of activated acceptance 
contingency (competence) and the domain of the effort measures (intelligence). This could have 
occurred if participants perceived that competence acceptance depends on actual school or 
workplace performance but not on intelligence per se. The same issue might have occurred for 
the lack of association of between baseline contingency of self-esteem on academics and the 
effort measures. 
Results of prior research suggest that relationship between self-esteem contingencies and 
effort may be moderated by trait self-esteem, perceived difficulty of the task, as well as presence 
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of feedback and its valence (Brook, 2005; Park & Maner, 2009). This may suggest that the 
relationship of activated contingencies of acceptance to effort should be examined more 
systematically with respect to contextual variables. For example, it is possible that activating 
contingency of acceptance in a given domain increases effort only when participants have a need 
to increase their relational value, perceive a clear connection between engaging in a task and 
their relational value, and possess sufficient ability to engage in the task in a way that may 
enhance their relational value. 
Effects of Activated Acceptance Contingencies on Anxiety 
 In the context of examination of a different dependent variable (i.e., anxiety), reports of 
less anxiety following priming of Intrinsic Acceptor compared to Competence Acceptor 
conceptually replicated prior research that showed less defensive responding following priming 
of intrinsic acceptance compared to contingent acceptance (e.g., Arndt et al., 2002). The 
observed trends in the direction of results also suggested that the effects of acceptance 
contingencies might operate in domain-specific fashion; this was evidenced by somewhat 
smaller amounts of anxiety following priming of Appearance Acceptor compared to Competence 
Acceptor even though Appearance Acceptor was perceived as being more contingently 
accepting. This may suggest that potential of performance on a task to change one’s relational 
value may constitute a source of threat, and that the threat may be greater when the task is in the 
domain that matches the activated domain of acceptance contingency. 
The examination of the effects within various subgroups of participants additionally 
contributed to the research on effects of situationally activated acceptance contingencies by 
identifying potential moderators of the effects. The moderators included factors that may 
strengthen the influence of the prime of contingent acceptance (desired closeness to the close 
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other, frequency of thinking about the close other, the perceived magnitude of the extent to 
which failure in the domain relevant to acceptance contingency would result in loss of relational 
value, and contingency of self-esteem on the relevant domain) and factors that may index general 
sensitivity to the influences of acceptance contingencies (need to belong and gender). 
According to these results, the reminder of a close other with competence contingency is 
more likely to elicit threat on a task related to competence when an individual desires closeness 
to the close other, frequently thinks about the close other, and/or perceives that his or her value 
in the close other’s eyes would substantially diminish if he or she were to perform poorly (note 
that these inferences for moderators are made based on effect sizes and consistent direction of 
results rather than statistical significance). These results are consistent with prior research that 
showed moderation of effects of situationally activated domain-specific acceptance 
contingencies by desired closeness (Horberg & Chen, 2010). Evidence of these relational 
moderators strengthens the inference that the observed effects were due to acceptance 
contingencies rather than other primed constructs. Future research should examine whether these 
risk factors combine additively, multiplicatively, or simply function as thresholds for sensitivity 
to acceptance contingencies. For example, it is plausible that greater desired closeness to the 
close other matters only for individuals who perceive that their relational value would decrease 
substantially in the close others’ eyes if they performed poorly. 
Evidence of moderating role of need to belong is consistent with evidence of greater 
sensitivity to social cues in individuals who are higher in need to belong (Pickett, 2004). Besides 
enhanced sensitivity to detection of acceptance contingencies in the first place, it is additionally 
plausible that those who are higher in need to belong are affected by any potential changes in 
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relational value to a greater degree, thus diminishing the requirement of substantial potential for 
loss of relational value in order to experience the effects. 
There could be a variety of reasons for why women appeared to have responded to a 
greater degree than men to the effects of the acceptance contingencies. One plausible reason is 
that the difference was due to gender differences in qualitative features of cognitive 
representations of social environment. While men tend to possess more categorical 
representations of their social environment, women tend to possess more representations 
involving specific relational exemplars within the larger categories (for example, when thinking 
of important relationships for a particular relational group, men are more likely to think of 
college community as a whole while women more of specific classmates; Foels & Tomcho, 
2009). Provided these representations extend to general thinking about what it takes to be 
accepted, women may perhaps have more developed representations of specific individuals, and 
thus be more responsive to primes of specific individuals than men; or perhaps activation of a 
specific individual is more likely to activate representation of a group as a whole for men, thus 
diffusing profiles of activated acceptance contingencies. The difference might also have been 
attributable to greater general tendency of women to report anxiety, or perhaps differences in 
perceived abilities required to do well on an intelligence test. If women suspected they were 
more likely to perform poorly than men, their perception of potential for loss of relational value 
might have been greater, thus making them more sensitive to the effects of acceptance 
contingency primes compared to men. It remains up to future research to examine whether men 
who possess presently identified risk characteristics for susceptibility to acceptance 
contingencies exhibit similar responses as women. 
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While any conclusions drawn from the present work are largely tentative given what was 
probably too small of a sample size because only a subset of participants appears to have 
possessed characteristics that index sensitivity to activation of acceptance contingencies, the 
evidence of smaller amounts of anxiety in competence-irrelevant acceptance contingency 
conditions for those at an elevated risk to sensitivity to acceptance contingencies enables 
speculations about practical significance of the findings for pursuit of competence and 
improvement of well-being. 
One of the most obvious practical implication of the current findings for educational 
settings lies in connection of the findings to self-affirmation intervention (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, 
& Master, A., 2006). Self-affirmation intervention consists of writing about one’s important 
values; its effectiveness in reducing anxiety-induced underperformance has been shown to be 
mediated by the extent to which students mention belonging themes in their writings (Shnabel et 
al., 2013). As the intervention appears to be effective only for certain subgroups of students 
(such as women or Blacks) and has been even shown to have negative effects for other 
subgroups (such as men, Miyake et al., 2010), the question emerges about whether there may be 
differences in acceptance contingencies of the affirmed social connections among the groups. 
The present work suggests that if a particular subgroup of students spontaneously tends to affirm 
social connections with those perceived to have competence acceptance contingency, that 
subgroup should benefit less or perhaps even be harmed by the intervention in the context of 
competence-related tasks. Future research examining differences in acceptance contingencies in 
groups for which the effectiveness of the intervention differs may help to account for the 
differential effectiveness of the intervention. Future research might also assess whether the 
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intervention is more consistently effective for larger segments of population if instructions are 
adjusted in a way that reduces likelihood of activation of harmful acceptance contingencies. 
 The results also provide additional support for the importance of understanding 
consequences of acceptance contingencies for well-being. Self-esteem contingency on academics 
(which, as analyzed in the literature review, can be understood as an indicator of chronic level of 
acceptance contingency on academics) is a predictor of depressive symptoms in students 
(Sargent, Crocker, & Luhtanen, 2006). A large body of literature has documented the need to 
belong and importance of its satisfaction for people’s well-being (e.g., León & Núñez, 2012; 
Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). In order to satisfy the need to belong, people need 
to perceive that they are close to the individuals important to them. However, failure at 
relationally-activated acceptance contingencies diminishes the perceived closeness (Horberg & 
Chen, 2010), and thus satisfaction of the basic need to belong. 
Accordingly, evidence of influences of situational activations of different acceptance 
contingencies suggests that an individual’s thinking patterns about close others may change the 
extent to which particular acceptance contingencies wield influence over the individual, and 
thereby the extent to which failures or potential failures affect well-being by means of depriving 
satisfaction of the individual’s need to belong.  If this is indeed the case, interventions that 
encourage individuals to establish social ties to people whom they perceive as having acceptance 
contingencies irrelevant to the domains in which the individuals frequently experience failure (or 
in which they are afraid of failure) could improve the individuals’ well-being. In fact, it is 
plausible, though admittedly still highly speculative, that well-being might be considerably 
improved even in the absence of any new actual social connections if individuals are guided to 
draw on reservoirs of strength present in their already existing social connections. The present 
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work suggests that the individuals may do so simply by reminding themselves of their close 
others who are perceived to have suitable profiles of contingencies of acceptance. 
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